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ABSTRACT
Purpose
I replicated and extended Eadeh and Chang (2019; Study 2) who found that reading a
story about pollution harming a child increased self-reported liberalism and increased support for
environmental regulation policies through greater negative affect (i.e., anger and disgust)
(Hypothesis 1). Eadeh and Chang’s (2019) threat-affordance model posits that perceived threat
can increase greater support for liberalism or greater support for conservatism, depending on the
type of threat. In contrast, Jost and colleagues’ (2003) system justification theory posits that
perceived threat asymmetrically predicts greater support for conservatism and greater systemsupporting collective action. This article advances a synthesis of these two theoretical
perspectives such that the threat of environmental pollution (a) increases system-challenging
collective action intentions and donation behavior through negative affect (Hypothesis 2) and (b)
increases liberalism, support for environmental regulation, collection action intentions, and
donation behavior through lower system justification (moderated by empathy), greater perceived
injustice, and greater negative affect (in order; Hypothesis 3).
Methods
In a pre-registered experiment, Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (n = 429) were
randomly assigned to read and write about one of two articles about environmental pollution
harming a child (versus one of two control articles). Afterward, they completed self-report
measures of their (a) emotional state and (b) perceptions of injustice, general system justification,
political orientation, support for environmental regulation policies, collective action intentions,
and willingness to donate a cash bonus to environmental conservation (versus keep the cash)
(presented in a random order).

Results
Hypotheses were tested using regression-based path analysis. As predicted, threat
increased self-reported liberalism and increased support for environmental regulation through
greater negative affect (Hypothesis 1). However, the direct effects of threat were inconsistent,
resulting in increased conservatism and less support for environmental regulation policies. As
predicted, threat also increased system-challenging collective action intentions and increased
donations through greater negative affect (Hypothesis 2). However, the direct effects of threat
were again inconsistent, resulting in less system-challenging collective action intentions and less
donations. Contrary to what was predicted, threat had no direct effect on system justification;
therefore, threat did not affect outcomes through low system justification (moderated by
empathy), greater perceived injustice, and greater negative affect (in order; Hypothesis 3).
Supplemental results did however reveal, however, that threat increased self-reported liberalism,
support for environmental regulation, and system-challenging collection action intentions through
greater negative affect (moderated by empathy), greater perceived injustice, and lower system
justification and through liberal political orientation when measured as a mediator versus an
outcome (in order). Supplemental analyses also revealed that fear and empathy mediated, and
empathy and political orientation moderated, the effects of threat on some of the outcomes, which
helped explain the inconsistencies between the direct and indirect effects.
Discussion
I interpret the current findings and their inconsistencies in the context of theoretical
synthesis of the threat-affordance model and system justification theory. I conclude by discussing
the consequences of perceived threats on political shifts and system change.
Keywords: threat, harm, environmental pollution, political ideology, injustice, system
justification, collective action, cognition, affect, emotion

CHALLENGING SOCIAL SYSTEMS UNDER THE THREAT OF POLLUTION:
REPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF EADEH AND CHANG (2019)

A Thesis
Submitted
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

Dylan J. Pieper
University of Northern Iowa
May 2020

ii
This Study by: Dylan J. Pieper
Entitled: Challenging Social Systems Under the Threat of Pollution: Replication and
Extension of Eadeh and Chang (2019)

has been approved as meeting the thesis requirement for the
Degree of Master of Arts

Date

Dr. Nicholas G. Schwab, Chair, Thesis Committee

Date

Dr. Helen C. Harton, Thesis Committee Member

Date

Dr. Jiuqing Cheng, Thesis Committee Member

Date

Dr. Jennifer J. Waldron, Dean, Graduate College

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
Threat-Affordance Model ............................................................................................... 4
Perceptions of Issue Ownership .................................................................................. 4
Direct Empirical Support ............................................................................................ 5
Moral Emotions Motivate Threat-Mitigation ............................................................. 6
Differentiation in Harm Perception ............................................................................ 9
System Justification Theory .......................................................................................... 11
Ideological antidote to inequality.......................................................................... 12
Relational, epistemic, and existential needs ......................................................... 13
Meta-analyses on fundamental needs ................................................................... 15
Changing Social Systems.......................................................................................... 16
Predicting Collective Action ..................................................................................... 17
System-Level Appraisals .......................................................................................... 20
The Present Study ......................................................................................................... 22
Hypothesis 1: Threat Increases Liberalism—Mediated by Greater Negative Affect 23
Rationale ............................................................................................................... 23
Prediction .............................................................................................................. 24
Hypothesis 2: Threat Increases System-Challenging Collective Action Intentions
and Behavior—Mediated by Greater Negative Affect ............................................. 24
Rationale ............................................................................................................... 24
Prediction .............................................................................................................. 24

iv
Hypothesis 3: Threat Increases Liberalism and System-Challenging Collective
Action Intentions and Behavior—Mediated by Lower System Justification
(Moderated by Greater Empathy), Greater Perceived Injustice, and Greater Negative
Affect ........................................................................................................................ 24
Rationale ............................................................................................................... 25
A priori prediction................................................................................................. 25
Post-hoc reformulation.......................................................................................... 25
CHAPTER TWO: METHODS ......................................................................................... 28
Design ........................................................................................................................... 28
Participants .................................................................................................................... 28
Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 29
Measures ....................................................................................................................... 30
Current Emotional State ............................................................................................ 30
System Justification .................................................................................................. 32
Perceived Injustice .................................................................................................... 33
Political Orientation .................................................................................................. 34
Support for Environmental Regulation ..................................................................... 34
Collective Action Intentions ..................................................................................... 34
Collective Donation Behavior................................................................................... 36
Socioeconomic Status ............................................................................................... 37
CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS ....................................................................................... 38
Statistical Assumptions ................................................................................................. 39
Unique Effects of Emotion ........................................................................................... 40
Between-Group Comparisons ....................................................................................... 43
Path Analyses ................................................................................................................ 45
Hypothesis 1.............................................................................................................. 45

v
A priori .................................................................................................................. 45
Supplemental......................................................................................................... 46
Hypothesis 2.............................................................................................................. 49
A priori .................................................................................................................. 49
Supplemental......................................................................................................... 49
Hypothesis 3.............................................................................................................. 54
A priori .................................................................................................................. 54
Supplemental......................................................................................................... 56
CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION ................................................................................... 63
Model Fit ....................................................................................................................... 64
Belief-Behavior Gap ..................................................................................................... 66
Inconsistencies in the Results ....................................................................................... 67
Hidden Mediators...................................................................................................... 67
Moderation ................................................................................................................ 68
Limited Statistical Power .......................................................................................... 70
Theoretical Implications ............................................................................................... 71
Limitations and Future Directions ................................................................................ 74
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION................................................................................... 80
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 82
APPENDIX A: INFORMED CONSENT ........................................................................ 94
APPENDIX B: POLLUTION CONDITIONS ................................................................. 96
APPENDIX C: COMPARISON CONDITIONS ............................................................. 98
APPENDIX D: POWER ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 100
APPENDIX E: INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA ..................................... 102
APPENDIX F: SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION SCALE .................................................... 103

vi
APPENDIX G: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PREFERENCES ................................ 104
APPENDIX H: DEMOGRAPHICS ............................................................................... 105
APPENDIX I: SCATTERPLOT MATRIX .................................................................... 106
APPENDIX J: CORRELATION MATRICES ............................................................... 107

vii
LIST OF TABLES
PAGE
Table 1. Indirect Effect Sizes with Confidence Intervals for Mediation: The Effect of
Environmental Threat on Sociopolitical Attitudes through Emotion ............................... 42
Table 2. Independent Samples T-Test (Mann-Whitney U) ............................................... 44
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals for
Variables in the Environmental Threat Conditions (n = 218)......................................... 107
Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals for
Variables in the Comparison Conditions (n = 211) ........................................................ 108

viii
LIST OF FIGURES
PAGE
Figure 1. Path Diagrams for Hypothesis 3 (A Priori and Post-Hoc) ................................ 27
Figure 2. Overview of Results for Hypothesis 1 and 2 .................................................... 54
Figure 3. Regression Path Model Assessing Hypothesis 3 (A Priori) .............................. 56
Figure 4. Regression Path Model Assessing Hypothesis 3 (Post-Hoc, Part 1) ................ 58
Figure 5. Regression Path Model Assessing Hypothesis 3 (Post-Hoc, Part 2) ................ 60

1
CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, nine-year-old Ella Kissi-Debrah died because a thick mucus clogged her
lungs (Marshall, 2018). This mucus was linked to illegally high levels of air pollution
near the London roads where Ella walked to school. Spikes in air pollution, as measured
by a nearby university, correlated with Ella’s asthma symptoms and her hospital
admissions. Since Ella’s death, her mother has taken precautions to protect her other
children by changing the path they walk to school and taking Ella’s case to the High
Court. Up to this writing, Ella’s mother is still petitioning the High Court to rule air
pollution as the cause of Ella’s death, a ruling that would be the first of its kind for the
court (Marshall, 2019). Ella’s mother said that she wanted “to show to the British public
what air pollution can actually do – they need to start getting angry [emphasis added]
about this” (Oppenheim, 2019). Indeed, after Ella’s death, concerned mothers and allies
protested the government to address pollution and climate change (Christian, 2019).
Threats, such as environmental pollution in the example above, can motivate
people to do something to ameliorate the threat. A threat may be anything that is likely to
harm or endanger an organism (e.g., natural disasters and infectious disease). The threataffordance model (Eadeh & Chang, 2019) predicts that people will endorse beliefs,
behaviors, and collective actions that they believe will address a perceived threat, a
process partially mediated by the degree to which perceived threats evoke anger and
disgust (Lambert et al., 2019). Classically, affordances are perceptions that objects in the
environment can help individuals meet their goals (Gibson, 1979). For example, a home
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affords dryness and warmth, and shoes afford walking on rough or sharp surfaces while
avoiding pain and injury. Extending this concept to political attitudes, if a person is
angered by distinct perceptual threats (e.g., terrorism and environmental pollution), they
will likely endorse political policies and ideologies they expect to competently manage
those threats (conservatism and liberalism, respectively; Eadeh, 2017; Eadeh & Chang,
2019). Thus, people expect some shared issues (e.g., foreign enemies and climate change)
to be addressed by the state or government and by certain political parties (Petrocik,
1996), perhaps because we expect that these issues could only be addressed by the state.
In this way, particular political ideologies afford different perceived protections in
response to specific perceived threats.1
The threat-affordance model contrasts with system justification theory (SJT; Jost
& Banaji, 1994) and the conservatism as motivated social cognition framework (Jost et
al., 2003). Whereas the threat-affordance model suggests that people will shift toward
specific policies and responses that address a particular threat based on the negative
emotional state that the threat evokes, the latter theories suggest that people shift their
global political ideology in response to threat. More precisely, research in this latter area
claims that perceiving threats in general (e.g., terrorist attacks, home invasions, and
system-threats) is associated with increased conservatism (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al.,

1

In this paragraph, I begin talking about perceptions of threat. Unlike the real threat Ella faced, researchers
cannot create an environment where participants are likely to be harmed; however, people need only to
perceive a threat to motivate a response. Thus, researchers often study how people’s perceptions of threat
change their beliefs and behavior. To do this, researchers either (a) conduct field studies after real disasters
(e.g., the 9/11/01 attacks; Nail & McGregor, 2009), (b) prime threat (e.g., by having participants read an
article on recent terrorist attacks; Eadeh, 2017), or (c) ask participants to self-report how much they worry
about a threat (e.g., “I worry that I might be killed or injured in a terrorist attack”; Crowson et al., 2006).
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2015; Jost, Stern et al., 2017). Jost, Stern et al. (2017) argue that there is a linkage
“between existential needs to reduce threat and politically conservative rhetoric and
ideology, insofar as the latter tends to offer relatively simple, decisive, rigid, orderly,
familiar, conventional, efficient, black-and-white, hierarchical, and authoritative solutions
to social problems, challenges, and opportunities” (p. 343). However, currently no
research has attempted to integrate these two perspectives into one model, which I
propose a resolution to below.
To accomplish this goal, I first review emerging work on the threat-affordance
model and argue that (a) people hold stereotypical assumptions about the ability of
political entities to address issues of threat, (b) moral emotions motivate political-shifts,
and (c) political ideologies are perceptual systems for reducing harm. Then, I argue that
perceptions of threat evoke appraisals of social systems (e.g., as unjust, unfair, or
otherwise incompetent), which I follow with a literature review of SJT. Finally, I advance
my rationale for synthesizing the threat-affordance model and SJT. Specifically, I
propose that system justification is attenuated when people perceive threats that are
associated with a liberal shift. I test this proposition by replicating a study that found that
the threat of environmental pollution increased liberal attitudes through negative affect
(i.e., anger and disgust; Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2) and extending this paradigm to
examine whether perceptions of injustice and general system justification also mediate
this relationship. In addition, I examine empathy as a mediator and moderator of these
relationships, as it is expected to arise when perceiving pollution harming a person, in
addition to political orientation, as it may function both as a predictor and an outcome.
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Threat-Affordance Model
Perceptions of Issue Ownership
Different responses to threat may reflect differences in people’s subjective
judgement of political entities (e.g., liberals as effective at addressing and reducing
corporate corruption; conservatives as effective at securing borders). The threataffordance model assumes that people’s support for either a liberal or conservative
response to a perceived threat is influenced by stereotypical assumptions about which
political party will most competently address the threat. In line with this view, issueownership theory predicts that people support political parties and candidates based on
their perceived competencies for addressing the issues that people are concerned about
(Petrocik, 1996). Across 17 countries and three decades, voters considered liberals to
more competently handle issues related to the environment, social security, and
healthcare compared to conservatives, and voters considered conservatives to more
competently handle issues related to asylum/immigration, law and order, the European
Union, taxes, and the economy compared to liberals (Seeberg, 2017; see also Newport,
2014; Saad, 2007). Issues that are not clearly owned by a specific political party include
education, elderly care, unemployment, and families (Seeberg, 2017). Shifts in issue
ownership have only slightly shifted over the past three decades, with no major issue
changes from the left to the right (Seeberg, 2017).
In contrast, other research suggests that the salience of some economic threats
may favor liberalism over conservatism (Brandt et al., 2019), raising some doubt about
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the fidelity or stability of some issue-ownership stereotypes. However, one possible
explanation is that some issues (e.g., the economy) may appeal to both conservative and
liberal tendencies (e.g., the desire to reduce government spending compared to the desire
to increase government-sponsored basic income). These limitations aside, people show
differences in their stereotypes about which political parties will best handle certain
threats, a finding that is largely consistent with the types of threats that tend to increase
either conservative or liberal responses.
Direct Empirical Support
As of this writing, three experimental studies have been published on the threataffordance model (Eadeh & Chang, 2019). These experiments primarily examined
whether certain threats cause a liberal-shift, as many studies have already documented
that many threats (mainly terrorist attacks, xenophobic threats, and home invasions)
cause a conservative-shift (for a recent meta-analysis, see Jost, Stern et al., 2017). Across
three studies, Amazon Mechanical Turk workers read short news-type articles as
manipulations of threat, either depicting harm associated with denial of healthcare
insurance (Study 1), environmental pollution (Study 2), or corporate greed (Study 3). In
each respective study, people reported increased support for interventionist healthcare
regulations (Study 1), increased support for environmental regulations (Study 2), and
increased support for financial regulations (Study 3). These effects were explained
primarily through feelings of self-reported anger and disgust but not through fear. As for
other outcomes, there was evidence that the threat of environmental pollution (Study 2)
directly increased liberal political orientation, increased support for regulation of
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healthcare systems, and decreased social conservatism. As for interactions between the
threat manipulations and political orientation, there was some evidence that the denial of
healthcare manipulation (Study 1) interacted with political orientation such that people
who were more liberal reported increased anger in the threat (versus control) conditions
and showed a greater association between anger and support for regulation of healthcare
systems. This latter finding suggests that liberals may be more sensitive to some threats
that cause liberal shifts than people of other political orientations.
In addition to Eadeh and Chang’s (2019) recent experiments, other correlational
studies lend support to the threat-affordance model (Brandt et al., 2019; Kahn &
Björklund, 2020). First, Brandt et al. (2019) conducted a cross-national, multi-level
network analysis on the World Values Survey and found that some economic threats
were associated with liberalism, whereas threats of violence were associated with
conservatism. Second, Kahn and Björklund (2020) conducted a series of six studies
across nations (mainly in North American, Europe, and Australia) and found that
liberalism was associated with threats of omission (i.e., unintentional, indirect, nonmalicious, and passive threats) and conservatism was associated with threats of
commission (i.e., intentional, direct, malicious, and active threats). Threats of omission
were associated with environmental threats and threats against social justice, whereas
threats of commission were associated with threats of violence.
Moral Emotions Motivate Threat-Mitigation
People are motivated to address threats particularly when they feel moral
emotions, such as anger, disgust, and contempt—and perhaps empathy and sadness.
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According to appraisal theory (Frijda & Mesquita, 1998), people’s appraisals of
situations (e.g., unfair or harmful) result in certain emotions (e.g., anger) and action
tendencies (e.g., approaching the source of unfairness or harm; helping those affected by
the source of unfairness or harm). From a dyadic morality perspective, harm is the
dominant appraisal that results in emotions such as anger and disgust across the political
spectrum (Gray & Wegner, 2011). This perspective lends support for the threataffordance model finding that negative affect (i.e., anger and disgust) partially mediates
the effect of perceived threat on political responses (Eadeh & Chang, 2019).
Emotions such as anger, disgust, and contempt share action tendencies that
compel people to act against moral transgressors who cause some type of harm (see
Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; for a full treatment on anger, see Lambert et al., 2019). For
example, German participants who engaged in collective action against outgroup
members who caused them harm reported feeling anger and contempt toward them and
reported feeling positive emotions toward their ingroup (Becker et al., 2011). In addition,
in online samples from the United States and Norway, participants responded to threats of
corporate environmental irresponsibility and environmental pollution by reporting more
moral emotions such as anger, disgust, and contempt (but not fear or sadness) after
reading about the threat (Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2; Xie et al., 2015). In turn, anger,
disgust, and contempt (but not fear or sadness) were also associated with more support
for complaining about and boycotting the irresponsible corporation and more support for
stricter environmental regulation policies. However, note that anger does not always lead
to aggressive, punishing types of behavior. Anger has been associated with prosocial
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behaviors in response to unfairness or injustice (e.g., charitable giving), even when
accounting for empathetic responses (for a review, see van Doorn et al., 2014).
It is reasonable to question whether these moral emotions, specifically anger,
disgust, and contempt, are related to different types of appraisals and behaviors. Indeed,
some research suggests that anger, disgust, and contempt are related to qualitatively
different appraisals to sources of harm and varying extremities of retributive behavior
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Tausch et al., 2011). For instance, Stanford students reported
feeling more anger when a transgression was appraised as self-relevant, more disgust
when a person was appraised as immoral, and more contempt when a person was
appraised as incompetent (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). In addition, these moral emotions
may result in various extremities of retributive behavior. Among German students, those
who reported more perceived injustice and anger were more likely to support normative
collective action (e.g., participating in meetings and demonstrations), but people who
reported more contempt were more likely to support nonnormative behavior (e.g., violent
retaliation; Tausch et al., 2011), suggesting that contempt is associated with more
detachment and less peacekeeping. However, people also tend to report these emotions
in concert, suggesting that these emotions make up an underlying moral-emotional factor
and lead to similar action tendencies (e.g., Eadeh & Chang, 2019; Hutcherson & Gross,
2011; Xie et al., 2015).
Anger, disgust, and contempt may not be the only moral emotions. For example,
empathy has been associated with perceptions of harm and heightened levels of moral
outrage (i.e., anger), although it is debated whether this response stems from a motive to
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altruistically help people who are suffering or wanting to superficially help people in
order to self-regulate (e.g., Batson et al., 2007; Neuberg et al., 1997). In addition,
although fear is often associated with caution and avoidance and sadness is often
associated with giving up and withdrawing, both emotions tend to correlate with anger
and aggression such that, in some cases, fear indirectly predicts outgroup aggression
through ingroup affiliation (Spanovic et al., 2010) and sadness predicts ingroup loyalty
(Smith et al., 2008) as well as support for aggressive regulatory policies (Eadeh, 2017,
Study 3 [Healthcare insurance denial threat]; Pieper et al., 2020). However, note that
fear and sadness do not always align with the action tendencies of anger and do align
with their expected emotional appraisals. In other words, as would be anticipated, fear
(Miller et al., 2009) and sadness (Eadeh, 2017, Study 3 [ISIS threat]) have also been
found to suppress the effect of anger on political attitudes and collective action.
Taken together, this research suggests that moral emotions—such as anger,
disgust, and contempt—and perhaps other emotions such as empathy, sadness, and fear—
motivate people to address threats by taking action against a moral transgressor or source
of perceived threat (who is appraised as unjust, unfair, or otherwise incompetent) or by
helping people who have been harmed.
Differentiation in Harm Perception
Other theories also support the threat-affordance model by explicating both the
centrality of harm across political ideologies (the dyadic theory of morality; Schein &
Gray, 2015) and how differences between liberals and conservatives alter their harm
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perceptions (moral foundations theory and the differentiated threat model; Graham et al.,
2011; Laham & Corless, 2016).
According to the dyadic theory of morality, liberal and conservative ideologies
share the same common module for perceiving harm between a moral agent and a moral
patient, but people who endorse these ideologies vary in their exposure to harm and
cultural scripts for perceiving and mitigating harm (Schein & Gray, 2015). From this
perspective, the differences between conservatives and liberals are variations in their
harm perception. Liberals may be thought of as “out-group specialists” associated with
greater out-group favoritism, universalism, creativity, openness, empathy, and
compassion; whereas conservatives may be thought of as “in-group specialists”
associated with greater in-group favoritism, politeness (an aspect of conscientiousness),
dogmatism, and sensitivity to (as well as avoidance of) negative stimuli (Choma et al.,
2012; Hasson et al., 2018; Hirsh et al., 2010; Mendez, 2017; Nail et al., 2009; Waytz et
al., 2016).
This differentiation of qualities between liberals and conservatives can also be
viewed through the lens of moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2011), which
suggests that liberals tend to endorse moral foundations associated with Individuating
(i.e., they value care/harm and fairness) and conservatives tend to endorse moral
foundations associated with Binding (i.e., they favor their ingroup, authority, and purity).
Building from moral foundations theory, Laham and Corless’s (2016) advanced a
differentiated threat model, suggesting that liberals are more sensitive to social evaluation
threats (associated with Individuating foundations) whereas conservatives are more
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sensitive to disgust-related threats (i.e., reminders of contagions and animals; associated
with Binding foundations). However, this is not to say that liberals are not disgusted
when perceiving certain types of threatening stimuli (e.g., environmental pollution or
corporate greed; Eadeh & Chang, 2019), which echoes the theme that conservatives and
liberals share a common moral-emotional template for harm.
System Justification Theory
System justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994) is broadly defined as the tendency to
justify the status quo, especially established social systems. The primary goal of SJT is to
explain the entrenchment of inequality and to account for its pervasiveness. SJT
postulates that people justify social systems and rationalize inequality as a palliative
remedy to satisfy relational, epistemic, and existential needs (e.g., Hennes et al., 2012;
Jost & Hunyady, 2003). These three fundamental motivations tend to increase system
justification for both high- and low-status individuals. For instance, in community
samples of Israelis, when participants were told that the Israeli system was weak and
unstable (versus strong and stable), high-status Jews reported more ingroup favoritism,
whereas low-status Jews reported more outgroup favoritism (e.g., by endorsing
stereotypes of high status group as more “intelligent”; see Jost & Hunyady, 2003).
Threats to social systems is a crucial motivation for people to rationalize
inequality (e.g., the waning stability of Israel; Kay & Friesen, 2011). System threats risk
the legitimacy or stability of the status quo and societal systems that afford real or
imagined protection from potential harm. In psychological experiments, system threats
are often operationalized as essays criticizing the participants’ country and its social,
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political, and economic systems. System criticism (ostensibly written by a local or
foreign journalist, respectively) is especially likely to increase system justifying
stereotypes (e.g., powerful people as more “intelligent”; e.g., Kay et al., 2005) and result
in the derogation of people who challenge the system (e.g., a woman in a position of
power when her high status is appraised as nonnormative; Kay et al., 2009).
People are especially likely to justify social systems if people think they depend
on those systems to meet their goals, if they think of those systems as inescapable, or if
they feel like they have little personal control over their lives (see Jost, 2019; Kay &
Friesen, 2011). People may rely on existing social systems or system authorities (e.g.,
university professors and police officers; van der Toorn et al., 2011) to feel safe from
harm or to compensate for their feelings of powerlessness (e.g., Kay et al., 2008). Thus,
under conditions of high system dependence, high system inescapability, and low
personal control, people may think it is costly to criticize social systems and beneficial to
justify social systems insofar as this behavior serves an antidote to inequality and satisfies
relational, epistemic, and existential needs.
Ideological antidote to inequality. SJT postulates that people justify the status quo
“to cope with circumstances they cannot change” (p. 148), and that privileged ideologies
serve a palliative function against redressing inequalities (Jost & Hunyady, 2003).
System-justifying ideologies are manifold and include political conservatism, right-wing
authoritarianism, a Protestant work ethic, and a meritocratic ideology (for more, see Jost
& Hunyady, 2005). For example, when American students read meritocratic “rags to
riches” stories about becoming an advantaged person (e.g., a person who worked hard to
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become a newspaper editor), they reported less moral outrage than when they read low
system-justification stories about helping a disadvantaged person (e.g., a person raising
money for a friend with cancer; Wakslak et al., 2007). These reduced levels of moral
outrage were associated with participants reporting less personal support for social
programs for the disadvantaged (e.g., a crisis hotline) and less support for the government
to fund them (Wakslak et al., 2007).
Not only does system-justification influence people to avoid redressing
inequalities, but it is also associated with positive, system-affirming emotions. In a
national survey across 10 countries, conservatives reported feeling happier than liberals
even in countries with higher economic inequality, and this effect was not accounted for
by their demographics or individual differences in cognition (Napier & Jost, 2008; cf.
McCall et al., 2017). Longitudinal evidence also suggests that system justification
ameliorates anxiety and depression and promotes well-being regardless of variability in
inequality across societies or the social status of individuals (Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018).
Therefore, the overarching motive of system-justification is that it serves a palliative
function against inequality by moving away from negative emotions (e.g., moral outrage)
and moving toward positive emotions (e.g., happiness).
Relational, epistemic, and existential needs. SJT posits that people will justify the
status quo to satisfy (1) relational needs (for shared reality with others), (2) epistemic
needs (for knowledge and certainty), and (3) existential needs (for safety and security).
First, system justification satisfies relational needs to affiliate with close others;
people bring their beliefs closer to close others’ beliefs through social influence processes
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(Hardin & Higgins, 1996). For instance, when students with one liberal and one
conservative parent wrote about their conservative parent, they reported more general
system-justification beliefs (e.g., that American society is fair)—regardless of whether
the children wrote about positive or negative experiences with that parent (Jost et al.,
2008). Therefore, to maintain relationships that help us meet affliction needs, people
likely justify the privileged ideology in the relationship.
Second, system justification satisfies epistemic (i.e., knowledge-orientated) needs,
specifically a dimension of closed-mindedness, commonly operationalized as a low need
for closure and a low need for cognition. These epistemic needs are related to desiring
certainty (or, in other words, avoiding uncertainty) and exerting less mental effort,
respectively (Cacioppo et al., 1984; Kruglanski et al., 1993). For instance, when students
or online participants report greater need for closure and a lower need for cognition, they
also report greater system justification of American society, more support for systemjustifying political movements (i.e., the Tea Party or Occupy Wall Street), and greater
political conservatism (Hennes et al., 2012; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011).
Third, system justification satisfies people’s existential needs for security or
managing threat. When people perceive threat, they are more likely to endorse systemjustifying ideologies (i.e., conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism) and report
greater levels of ingroup (ethnic and national) favoritism (Jost et al., 2003; Jost, 2017;
Jost, Stern et al., 2017; Nail et al., 2009; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011). However, Eadeh and
Chang (2019) note that 82% of the threats in the recent meta-analysis conducted by Jost,
Stern et al. (2017) consisted of terrorist attacks and the remaining threats were largely
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xenophobic threats or threats of physical violence or harm. Therefore, it is possible that
only certain types of threats, such as threats of commission (Kahn & Björklund, 2020),
activate system-justifying existential needs.
These three needs may operate both dependently and independently to increase
system-justification. In terms of dependent relationships, existential needs have been
found to predict epistemic needs. In one study, students’ answered items about how much
they worry about terrorism with response options ranging from somewhat to a great
extent (or not at all to somewhat) to prime perceptions of threat (Thórisdóttir & Jost,
2011). Priming these students to think that they worry about terrorism resulted in them
reporting a more conservative political orientation. The effect of the threat prime on
increased conservative orientation was mediated by closed-mindedness, suggesting that
one need can explain the effects of another. However, these three needs may also operate
independently. In another study, when people in an online sample self-reported greater
relational, epistemic, and existential needs, each need independently predicted greater
general system-justification and support for political movements (Hennes et al., 2012).
In summary, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that people endorse systemjustifying ideologies and resist social change (e.g., movements toward equality) to satisfy
relational, epistemic, and existential needs. This evidence implies that system-justifying
ideologies are favored when people need to fulfill these fundamental needs.
Meta-analyses on fundamental needs. Meta-analyses show small to medium
effects for relational, epistemic, and existential needs increasing conservatism (Jost,
2017; Jost, Stern et al., 2017). The authors of the meta-analysis claim that there is
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ideological asymmetry across existential needs (e.g., perceived threat favors
conservatism), however, the design of the meta-analyses is not a symmetrical design on
which to test assumptions of existential asymmetries. Specifically, the authors do not
catalog types of threats that could symmetrically span across conservative and liberal
ideologies. As discussed previously, a majority of these threats were threats of terrorism,
and other types of threats seem to in fact increase liberalism (e.g., Eadeh & Chang, 2019).
Although Jost et al. (2003) pioneered research and theory associating threat with
conservatism, his and his colleagues’ meta-analysis (Jost, Stern et al., 2017) also found
that some threats increase liberalism. In their meta-analysis, the authors reviewed a
survey conducted at Chapman University with 1,287 participants (from unpublished data
provided by Christopher Brader). Twelve of the 73 specific fearful stimuli showed a
relationship to political attitudes (see Figure 5 in Jost, Stern et al., 2017). Fear of “climate
change, pollution, overpopulation, growing old, and police brutality” were associated
with increased liberal attitudes. Fear of “government surveillance, government drones in
the U.S., terrorist attacks, whites losing majority status, government corruption, illegal
immigration, and gun control” was associated with increased conservative attitudes. This
pattern is consistent with predictions made by the threat-affordance model. However,
Jost, Stern et al. (2017) did not address these data in their conclusion.
Changing Social Systems
People may not always think it is beneficial to justify social systems under threat.
System change is especially likely when (a) there is an opportunity to change the system
(e.g., to vote), (b) the social change aligns with system-level values or is supported by
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system authorities, or (c) when the current system becomes too corrupt or illegitimate to
fulfill people’s fundamental needs for affiliation, certainty, and safety (Friesen et al.,
2019). For instance, people are less likely to justify social systems when they perceive
low social mobility or high economic inequality (Day & Fiske, 2017; McCall et al.,
2017). Similarly, according to an analysis of the World Values Survey, respondents’
perceptions of system instability (e.g., government corruption) were associated with
increased support for more government responsibility despite system-justifying motives
due to low perceived self-control (Kay et al., 2008, Study 3). Therefore, one approach
suggests that people have dual motives: A system-justification motive and a systemchange motive (Johnson & Fujita, 2012). Johnson and Fujita (2012) found that people are
more likely to desire system change when people think a system is changeable and selfrelevant and that the problem was formally diagnosed by high-level system authorities.
People may therefore experience motives to both justify and change social systems,
depending on the context. More work on the dual-motive approach may reveal that
fundamental needs are also linked to a system-change motive (see also Jost, 2019).
Predicting Collective Action
Although system-change may be possible, according to SJT, most people are not
easily motivated to protest injustices or inequality given the advantage of systemjustifying ideologies to satisfy people’s fundamental needs. Unlike the assertion made by
the affordance model that people are motivated to fix perceived threats (i.e., an existential
need; Eadeh & Chang, 2019), SJT predicts that people’s existential needs tend to
motivate them to downplay or support false information about perceived threats
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altogether (e.g., climate change and environmental problems; Jost, 2015; Vainio et al.,
2014). In addition, changing the status quo can be difficult because of negative judgments
system-justifiers have of system-challengers. For example, in one study, traditionalists
judged reformers as extreme and ignored their shared qualities (Keltner & Robinson,
1997). Thus, to change the status quo, a person must actively imagine and work against
the system (the needs the current system satisfies) toward an alternative system, a pursuit
that may “feel colder and less appealing than the status quo” (Eidelman & Crandall,
2009; p. 100). Therefore, the route to system-challenging action tendencies requires
focused effort.
SJT predicts that there two types of collective action that a person could be
motivated to move toward (Jost, Becker et al., 2017). First, people could be motivated to
move toward a system-supporting collective action (or inaction). System-supporting
collective action may take the form of counter-protest (e.g., climate activists in Canada
encountered gas and oil workers who gathered in a counter-protest; Zabjek, 2019). SJT
suggests that higher levels of system-justification proceed system-supporting collective
actions. Second, people could be motivated to move toward system-challenging
collective action (or inaction). For example, hostile sexism (versus benevolent sexism)
tends to motivate women to take collective action against gender inequality (e.g.,
participate in a rally; Becker & Wright, 2011). System-challenging collective action was
also demonstrated in the opening story when people protested the British government to
prevent environmental pollution and climate change (Christian, 2019). SJT suggests that
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lower levels of system-justification proceeds system-challenging collective action.
Although driven by different motivations, both actions are examples of collective action.
In addition to system justification, people’s motivation to engage in systemsupporting versus system-challenging collective action is also partially mediated by their
perceptions of injustice and levels of anger (Jost, Becker et al., 2017). As people justify
social systems, they perceive less inequality toward disadvantaged groups, which
decreases their anger and increases their system-supporting protest intentions—however,
as people begin to condemn social systems, they perceive more inequality toward
disadvantaged groups, which increases their anger and increases their system-challenging
protest intentions (Osborne et al., 2019). Research that I discussed previously also shows
that perceptions of injustice increases feelings of outrage (Jost et al., 2012; Wakslak et
al., 2007). Thus, in line with the dual-motives approach (Johnson & Fujita, 2012), people
may be motivated to downplay injustice, but when injustice is sufficiently salient, people
feel angry and move toward social change instead.
It is also important to note that there are multiple appraisals for anger when
comparing ingroup and outgroup members. Specifically, group-based anger is associated
with system-challenging collective action for low-status groups, but with systemsupporting action for high-status groups (Osborne et al., 2019). To engage the systemchange motive for a high-status outgroup member, other-oriented emotions, such as
empathy, may motivate perceptions of injustice for the other group and systemchallenging collective action. For instance, in one study, empathy, but not anger,
motivated men to take collective action on behalf of women (Iyer & Ryan, 2009).
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Therefore, low- and high- status individuals differ in their system needs and routes to
system-challenging collective action.
In summary, system justification makes predictions for when people will engage
in collective action that challenges or supports existing social systems. High systemjustification, low perceived injustice, and low system-based anger tend to predict systemsupporting collective action, especially among high-status individuals. In contrast, low
system-justification, high perceived injustice, and high system- or group-based anger tend
to predict system-challenging collective action, especially among high-status individuals.
In contrast to the threat-affordance model, SJT suggests that under threat, people tend to
report more system justifying attitudes, perceive less injustice, feel less system-based
anger, and endorse system-supporting collective actions (e.g. counter-protests to proenvironment protests; Jost, Becker et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019). However, given the
knowledge that certain threats also activate possible system-challenging ideologies (i.e.,
liberalism; Eadeh & Chang, 2019), the effect of perceived threat on increase liberal
responses may be explained by the opposite processes: low system-justification, high
perceived injustice, and high anger (or moral affect). In addition, people’s need to
manage the types of threat that tend to increase liberalism may decrease, rather than
increase, system-justification attitudes and increase system-challenging collective action.
System-Level Appraisals
Upon perceiving threat, people may appraise both a specific transgressor and a
social system as incompetent or immoral (e.g., unjust or unfair) and become motivated to
act against both agents. Research in the moral emotion literature typically examines the
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appraisal of a specific transgressor (e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Two of three
experimental manipulations of threat in studies of the threat-affordance model, however,
depicted more than one transgressor (Eadeh & Chang, 2019). In the denial of healthcare
insurance threat condition (Study 1), the story suggested that the insurer refused to pay
for a drug and that FDA was too slow to act to approve the use of drug. In the
environmental pollution threat condition (Study 2), the story suggested that local
industries were the cause of the pollution and that the lenient regulation of toxic pollution
across the U.S. also contributed to the harm. In the corporate greed condition (Study 3),
both loan-servicing banks and the government were appraised as responsible for the
financial crisis of 2008. The participants may have reported more support for stricter
government regulation policies across all three threat conditions, because the government
was appraised as culpable for the harm. Thus, participants may have considered social
systems to have a central influence over the perceived threat, which may lead them to act
against those systems when they were appraised as incompetent, unfair, or immoral or
otherwise responsible for the harm.
Action in response to these types of threat likely go beyond support for
government regulation to individual and collective actions. Recall the story in the
introduction about Ella’s death likely due to London pollution, and the government
permitting the pollution to occur at illegal and deadly levels (Marshall, 2018). Ella’s
mother took direct action by changing the route her children walked—in attempt to avoid
further harm from the source of the threat (possibly motivated by fear)—and taking Ella’s
case to the High Court—in attempt to fix the lack of regulation of deadly pollution
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(possibly motivated by anger). These two actions represent distinct threat-affordance
strategies at individual- and collective- levels of action. Either people may be motivated
to take individual action to protect themselves (or a few people) or to take collective
action to improve the welfare and status of a group (Iyer & Leach, 2009). Motivation to
act for the collective good is particularly relevant to the threat-affordance model, because
collective action often manifests as political action (e.g., protests, petitions, boycotts, and
formal complaints), which may align with shifts in political attitudes in response to a
perceived threat.
The Present Study
The threat-affordance model and SJT may be complementary such that the types
of perceived threats that increase liberalism (versus conservatism) may be associated with
low (versus high) system justification. SJT differs fundamentally from the affordance
model in that it was created to explain pervasive inequality in society rather than political
shifts due to perceived threat. However, both perspectives make predictions related to
political attitudes and ideology. SJT suggests that perceived threat is linked to systemjustifying ideologies such as conservatism (Jost, Stern et al., 2017). The threat-affordance
model, on the other hand, suggests that some threats may increase conservatism and other
threats may increase liberalism, depending on the type of threat (Eadeh & Chang, 2019).
The present study replicated and extended Eadeh and Chang (2019, Study 2) to integrate
these two perspectives.
The present study examined people’s self-reported emotions and political
attitudes in response to reading about environmental pollution harming a child by (a)
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replicating the effect that the perceived threat increased liberal political orientation and
increases support for liberal environmental regulatory policies through negative affect
(i.e., anger and disgust; Hypothesis 1; Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2); (b) evaluating the
effect of the perceived threat on self-reported system-challenging collective action
intentions and collective donation behavior through negative affect (Hypothesis 2); and
(c) further explaining the liberal-shift through self-reported system appraisals (i.e.,
system justification [moderated by empathy] and perceived injustice) and negative affect
(in order; Hypothesis 3; see Figure 1). For Hypothesis 1 through 2, empathy and fear
were tested along with negative affect as mediators of threat and political responses.
Empathy—and political orientation—were tested as moderators of perceived threat and
negative affect in supplemental analyses of Hypotheses 1 through 3. This analytic
strategy follows Xie et al. (2015) who found that empathy moderated the effect of
environmental irresponsibility on feelings of anger, which, in turn, was associated with
increased collective action intentions.
The following hypotheses were preregistered on OSF (https://osf.io/2md4e/)
(including the hypotheses labeled “a priori”) except for the post-hoc reformulation of
Hypothesis 3 (see next section).
Hypothesis 1: Threat Increases Liberalism—Mediated by Greater Negative Affect
Rationale. The first hypothesis functions as a replication of the findings of Eadeh
and Chang (2019, Study 2). They primarily found that stories of environmental pollution
harming a child increased support for government regulation of the environment (as a
direct effect) through negative affect (i.e., anger and disgust; as an indirect effect) but not
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through fear. In their supplementary analyses, they showed that perceived threat directly
increased liberal political orientation, a finding that was absent for other threats (i.e.,
denial of healthcare and corporate greed).
Prediction. Perceived environmental threat will increase liberalism
(operationalized as increased liberal political orientation and support for environmental
regulatory policies). This effect will be mediated by participants’ negative affect in
response to the threat primes.
Hypothesis 2: Threat Increases System-Challenging Collective Action Intentions and
Behavior—Mediated by Greater Negative Affect
Rationale. The second hypothesis functions as an extension of Eadeh and Chang’s
(2019) original findings to capture a wider range of political action affected by the threat
of environmental pollution, specifically collective action intentions (e.g., support for
boycotting corporate polluters and support for protesting the government) and collective
donation behavior (i.e., choosing to donate [versus keep] an extra 25 cents to support
environmental conservation).
Prediction. Perceived environmental threat will increase system-challenging
collective action intentions and collective donation behavior. The effect between
environmental threat and collective action intentions and behavior will be mediated by
how much participants report feeling negative affect after reading about the threat.
Hypothesis 3: Threat Increases Liberalism and System-Challenging Collective Action
Intentions and Behavior—Mediated by Lower System Justification (Moderated by
Greater Empathy), Greater Perceived Injustice, and Greater Negative Affect
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Rationale. The third hypothesis functions as an extension of Eadeh and Chang’s
(2019) original findings to include general system justification and perceptions of
injustice (i.e., that corporations and governments are corrupt do not care about people’s
health) as mediators of perceived environmental threat and political attitudes. Unlike
Eadeh and Chang, in Hypothesis 3 (a priori), I predicted that the perceived threat would
directly manipulate system justification. The rationale for this prediction was based on
the system justification theory of collection action (Osborne et al., 2019), which suggests
that perceived threat influences collection action through system justification, perceived
injustice, and anger (in order). Therefore, this system justification perspective assumes
cognitive (versus affective) primacy. However, recent research suggests that affect and
cognition are interdependent (Storbeck & Clore, 2007) and primacy is context dependent
(Tzuyin Lai et al., 2012); thus, both possibilities were tested.
A priori prediction. The effect of the environmental-threat prime stories on
increased liberal political orientation, support for stricter environmental regulation
policies, system-challenging collective action intentions, and collective donation behavior
will be mediated by less general system justification, more perceived injustice, and more
negative affect. The effect of the threat primes on system justification will also be
moderated by empathy such that as empathy increases, system justification will be further
weakened when reading a story about environmental pollution harming a child. Figure 1
illustrates these predictions in a path diagram.
Post-hoc reformulation. In a post-hoc reordering of the variables, I followed
Eadeh and Chang’s (2019) finding that perceived threat directly increases negative affect.
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I predicted that, in addition to negative affect, progressively increasing the broadness of
the constructs in order from high perceived injustice (context-specific) to low system
justification (diffuse), would, in turn, predict more liberal political orientation, more
support for environmental regulation policies, more system-challenging collective action
intentions, and more collective donation behavior (post-hoc, part 1). I also examined
political orientation as additional mediator, rather than an outcome, following general
system justification (post-hoc, part 2). This latter decision was made, because political
orientation and system justification are conceptualized as intimately related, such that
people justify systems “by latching onto pre-existing ideologies such as conservatism”
(Jost et al., 2009, p. 326). Therefore, this perspective assumes affective (versus cognitive)
primacy. This order is also conceptually consistent with the order of the survey, in which
participants responded to the emotional state inventory before the cognitive measures.
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Figure 1. Path Diagrams for Hypothesis 3 (A Priori and Post-Hoc)

Note. Support for Env. Regulation = Support for Environmental Regulation.
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CHAPTER TWO:
METHODS
Design
This study was a preregistered experiment administered online with approval of
an institutional review board (see Appendix A for informed consent). Participants were
randomly assigned to either read one of two threat-priming articles (about air or water
pollution harming a child; Appendix B), a threat-priming comparison article about food
allergies (following Eadeh & Chang, 2019; Appendix C), or another comparison article
about how water systems keep U.S. citizens safe (Appendix C).
Participants
Data from 498 participant responses were initially collected from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, a service that offers high quality data (Buhrmester et al., 2011; see
Appendix D for a power analysis). Participants were recruited using the research
recruitment tool CloudResearch (formerly known as TurkPrime; Litman et al., 2017) and
included only United States (U.S.) citizens who met screening criteria for having high
task completion rate and a unique and unsuspicious location (see Appendix B). Exclusion
procedures were used to flag and filter out participants who had a non-U.S. IP address or
who had duplicate IP addresses and participants who displayed automated, inattentive,
careless, or dishonest response patterns (Appendix B). These exclusion criteria resulted in
a final sample of 429 participants whose responses were analyzed.
Participants’ average age was 44.8 years old (SD = 13.37). There were slightly
more women (n = 226) than men (n = 201) in addition to two non-binary individuals.
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Most participants were White (n = 350), with a smaller proportion of participants
reporting non-White (n = 79; i.e., American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian; Black or
African American; Native Hawaiian or another Pacific islander; and Hispanic or Latinx).
Subjective socioeconomic status (measured on a 1 to 10 MacArthur scale) was slightly
below the mean and did not significantly differ between the perceived threat conditions
(M = 4.73 SD = 1.92) and the comparison conditions (M = 4.90, SD = 1.97).
Participants completed this study in exchange for 75 cents with the opportunity to
earn or to donate an additional 25 cents to the Sierra Club Foundation (i.e., an
organization engaged in conservation efforts). A total of 134 participants indicated they
wanted to donate their 25 cents, which meant they collectively donated $33.50 toward
environmental conservation.
Procedure
Participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk read the following task description:
“People’s attitudes on world events, natural systems, and society.” Participants who
selected the task were asked if they consented to the study (Appendix C). Upon giving
their consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of two threat-priming
conditions (Appendix D) or one of two comparison conditions (Appendix E). All
participants were asked to write five to six sentences (at least 100 characters) about the
article. Then, participants responded to items capturing their current emotional state.
Next, participants completed measures of system justification, perceived injustice,
political orientation, support for environmental regulatory policies, collective action
intentions, and collective donation behavior (all counter-balanced randomly across
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separate pages). Third, participants answered demographic questions about their age,
ethnicity, gender, educational achievement, and subjective socioeconomic status (SES);
answered a question regarding how honest their answers were; and typed a response in an
open-ended textbox if they had any questions or comments for the researcher (Appendix
F).
This procedure deviates from the procedure used by Eadeh and Chang (2019),
such that people did not always receive the environmental regulation policy attitudes
scale after completing the emotion items, because the order in which the cognitive
measures were presented were randomized. In addition, Eadeh and Chang presented the
political orientation item as part of the demographic’s measures, whereas, in the present
study, political orientation was presented in a randomized order with other attitude
variables. These changes were made to minimize possible order effects of threat on the
dependent variables (e.g., fatigue or context).
Measures
Items for each scale were presented in a random order. Alpha reliability
coefficients were computed in R using the psych package (Revelle, 2019), and SpearmanBrown reliability coefficients were also computed in R using the following formula:
(2 * variable) / (1 + variable). All factor analyses were conducted using JASP, which is a
point-and-click application that uses R as its computational engine (JASP Team, 2019).
Current Emotional State
Participants rated how they were feeling in the moment while completing the
questionnaire on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all; 2 = A little; 3 = Somewhat;
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4 = A good deal; 5 = Very much) across 12 emotion adjective items organized in 6 item
pairs. Feeling adjective pairs tapped into anger (angry and furious), disgust (disgusted
and sickened), fear (fearful and afraid), anxiety (anxious and worried), sadness (sad and
sorrowful), and empathy (sympathetic and compassionate). The empathy items were
obtained from Niezink et al. (2012), and the remaining emotion items were obtained from
Eadeh and Chang (2019) except for the author-generated adjective sorrowful, which
replaced the adjective dejected due to concerns about reader comprehension). A mean
score was calculated for each emotion for each participant by collapsing their answers to
these pairs of items. These emotion item pairs demonstrated high reliability (SpearmanBrown [S-B] coefficients > .88).
A principal component analysis with a promax rotation revealed a negative affect
component comprised of 10-items (i.e., anger, disgust, fear, anxiety, and sadness), which
explained 69% of variance (eigenvalue = 8.26), and an empathy component, which
explained 11% of variance (eigenvalue = 1.31). The following eigenvalue was 0.75, and a
parallel analysis suggested a two-factor solution. The component loadings were between
.66 and .92 for negative affect (α = .96) and between .95 (sympathetic) and .98
(compassionate) for empathy (S-B = .90). There were no significant cross-loadings
between these two components (none > .32). See Supplemental Analysis, Part A,
https://osf.io/2md4e/ for more details on this factor analysis.
As pre-registered, given the results of the PCA, a mean score should have been
calculated for negative affect and the empathy adjective pair for each participant by
collapsing their answers to the 10-items for negative affect. However, as discussed in the

32
supplemental results, the fear adjectives were removed from the negative affect scale
score due to fear suppressing the effect of perceived threat on political attitudes across
conditions (see “Unique Effects of Emotion” in “Results” section). This pattern of results
is consistent with Eadeh and Chang’s (2019) distinction between negative affect (i.e.,
disgust and anger) and fear. Hence, although the current data did not show two
components for fear and negative affect (as found by Eadeh & Chang, 2019), these
emotions were still analyzed separately.
System Justification
Participants rated their support for eight items on the System Justification scale
(Kay & Jost, 2003), such as “In general, you find society to be fair” and “American
society needs to be radically restructured” (reverse-scored) on a five-point Likert scale
(from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). A mean score was calculated for each
participant by collapsing their answers to these eight items (see Appendix D for all the
items for this measure.) The reliability of this scale was high (α = .90), which was similar
to the alpha coefficient found by the authors of the scale (α = .87; Kay & Jost, 2003). Kay
and Jost (2003) conducted an independent validation of the system justification scale
(SJS) and found convergence, but not redundancy, with other related concepts and scales,
specifically a need for a Just World Scale (JWS; e.g., "I feel that people get what they
deserve"; Lipkus, 1991) and a need for a Balanced Social World Scale (BSWS; e.g., "All
in all, the world is a 'balanced' place"; Kay & Jost, 2003). More precisely, Kay and Jost
found that SJS scores strongly predicted JWS scores (r = .67; adjusting for BSWS r =
.62) and modestly predicted BSWS scores (r = .37; after adjusting for JWS r = .21).
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Perceived Injustice
Perceived injustice has been measured by (a) using items that tap into people’s
experience with group discrimination or disadvantage (Osborne et al., 2019) and (b)
using questions about feeling that a certain situation is unfair, unjust, and illegitimate
(Tausch et al., 2011). However, because no measures of perceived injustice were found
that were suitable for the topic of pollution, participants rated their support for six authorgenerated items on a Likert scale (from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree):
“Many corporations don’t care enough about people’s health in the United States”; “Most
companies don’t do enough to protect the public from harm“; “Big industries do not care
much about people’s well-being, only the bottom-line”; “I am afraid that the government
doesn’t care enough about people’s health in the United States”; “As long as the
government is ‘in bed’ with corporations, the government does not work for the people”;
and “The government does not prioritize people’s well-being” on a five-point scale. The
former three items were written to emphasize corporate injustice, and the latter three
items were written to emphasize governmental injustice.
Perceived injustice against the government was positively correlated with
perceived injustice against the corporate polluters (Pearson’s r = .82), suggesting that
they were highly related constructs. A principal components analysis revealed that all six
items loaded onto one component for perceived injustice, explaining 77% of the variance
(eigenvalue = 4.60; following eigenvalue = 0.46, which fell below the parallel analysis
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simulated eigenvalue of > 1; see Supplemental Materials, Part B; https://osf.io/2md4e/).
Component loadings were between .85 and .90. Therefore, a mean score was calculated
for each participant by collapsing their answers to these six items. The reliability of this
scale was high (α = .94)
Political Orientation
Participants rated one item tapping political orientation: “What is your political
orientation?” on a seven-point scale (1 = Very Conservative; 2 = Conservative; 3 = Lean
Conservative; 4 = Moderate; 5 = Lean Liberal; 6 = Liberal; 7 = Very Liberal).
Support for Environmental Regulation
Participants rated 16 items related to their support for governmental regulation of
environmental pollution on a seven-point Likert scale (from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 =
Strongly agree; constructed by Eadeh & Chang, 2019). Sample items include “The
federal government should aggressively carry out environmental protection regulations”
and “The federal government should have a minimal role in regulating the coal industry”
(reverse-scored; see Appendix E for all the items included in this measure). A mean score
was calculated for support for environmental regulatory policies for each participant by
collapsing their answers to these 16 items. The reliability of this scale was high (α = .94)
and approximated the reliability found by the original authors of the scale (α = .92; Eadeh
& Chang, 2019, Study 2).
Collective Action Intentions
Participants rated four items related to their support for environmental activism
and governmental protest on a seven-point Likert scale (from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 =
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Strongly agree). Two of these four items were revised from the Environmental Attitude
Inventory (EAI) and the Environment Movement Activism sub-scale to emphasize
political activism: “I would like to join and participate in an environmentalist group
involved in local politics” and “I don’t think I would help to raise funds for a politician
who cared about environmental protection” (reverse-scored; Milfont & Duckitt, 2010).
Two additional author generated items were added to tap into people’s readiness to
protest the government: “I am willing to protest the government to take action against
environmental pollution” and “If asked to go to a pro-environmental protest outside my
local courthouse, I would.”
Participants rated four items related to their support for complaining about and
boycotting corporate polluters on a seven-point Likert scale (from 1 = Strongly disagree
to 7 = Strongly agree). Three items were revised from Xie et al. (2015) to make corporate
polluters the target of the collective action intentions, specifically “I would complain
directly to a corporate polluter, such as those who have dumped toxic waste into public
waterways”, “I would put pressure on corporate polluters to be socially responsible and
correct their bad practices”, and “I would encourage local suppliers or other companies
not to do business with known corporate polluters” (α = .97 for complaining; originally a
5-item scale with boycotting as a separate variable; Xie et al., 2015). One additional
author generated item was added to tap into people’s readiness to protest corporate
polluters: “I would support protesting a corporate polluter, such as coal plants, to be more
socially responsible about their emissions.”
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Collective action intentions against the government were positively associated
with collective action intentions against corporate polluters (Pearson’s r = .83),
suggesting that they were highly related constructs. A principal components analysis
revealed that all eight items loaded onto one component for collective action intentions,
explaining 68% of the variance (eigenvalue = 5.40; following eigenvalue = 0.83, which
fell below the parallel analysis simulated eigenvalue of > 1; see Supplemental Materials,
Part C; https://osf.io/2md4e/). Component loadings were between .53 and .89. The lowest
loading of .53 was for the reverse coded item “I don’t think I would help to raise funds
for a politician who cared about environmental protection”. The remaining loadings were
similar (between .83 and .89). Therefore, a mean score was calculated for each
participant by collapsing their answers to these eight items. The reliability of this scale
was high (α = .93).
Collective Donation Behavior
Collective action behavior was operationalized in the present study using an
online donation paradigm (O’Grady & Vandegrift, 2019). Following this paradigm,
participants were presented with the following donation task as a proxy of collective
action behavior: “You have the opportunity to earn an additional 25 cents for this survey,
or you can rally with other MTurk workers to help maintain a clean and unpolluted
environment by donating 25 cents to environmental conservation efforts. Please indicate
what you want to do with this additional 25 cents.” The possible response options were
binary: “I want to keep the 25 cents” or “I want to donate the extra 25 cents to
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environmental conservation efforts (the Sierra Club Foundation)”. Responses were
dummy coded for categorical contrast (0 = kept bonus; 1 = donated bonus).

Socioeconomic Status
Socioeconomic status was measured using the MacArthur scale (Adler et al.,
2000). This measure originally used a conceptual “ladder”; however, for the purposes of
the present study, this “ladder” was converted to a numbered slider for ease of
measurement. Participants read: “On the left side are the people who are the worst off,
those who have the least money, least education, worst jobs, or no job. On the right side
are the people who are the best off, those who have the most money, most education, and
best jobs. Use the slider to indicate where you think you stand in society.” The slider
included tick marks ranging from 1 to 10.
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CHAPTER THREE:
RESULTS
The critical alpha value (p-value) for inferring the significance of the hypotheses
was pre-registered (p < .05) and used the power analysis (see Appendix D). In addition,
for all path analyses, effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals including zero were not
considered significant, because with high statistical power, there is a high probability of
accurately failing to reject the null hypothesis.
Mean missing data across variable columns was less than 3%, which was
calculated using the MICE package (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011) for R.
Missing data was addressed by averaging across all available data (as proportion of
available item-level data was high and resulted in high reliability coefficients; following
Graham, 2009) and deleting cases listwise if they had mostly missing data across all the
observed variables (1 case; see Appendix E).
The two threat-priming conditions did not differ in their effects on political
orientation, environmental attitudes, collective action intentions, perceived injustice, or
system justification (ps > .11), nor did they show independence in regards to collective
donation behavior, χ2(3) = 0.35, p = 0.95; hence, these conditions were combined into a
single threat-priming group. Following the pre-registration, the comparison articles were
to be treated separately, because I predicted that the article on safe water systems would
increase system justification compared to the food allergies article. However, there was
no difference found between the control articles on general system justification (p = .95);
therefore, these conditions were combined for all further analyses.
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Statistical Assumptions
Univariate normality was assessed using Shapiro-Wilks tests (Bonferronicorrected), and multivariate normality was assessed using the gvlma package for R (Pena
& Slate, 2019). In both tests, the null hypothesis of a normal distribution of data was
rejected for all the variables in the current hypotheses and their corresponding linear
equations. However, no transformations were made to these variables as the primary
regression analyses used for this study are typically robust to normality violations (see
Hayes, 2017, p. 70).
Univariate homogeneity of variance was assessed using Levine’s test with
Bonferroni corrections, and multivariate homogeneity was assessed using the gvlma
package for R (Pena & Slate, 2019). In the univariate analyses, the null hypothesis of
homogeneity was rejected for negative affect and empathy. However, in the multivariate
analyses, the null hypothesis of homogeneity was not rejected for any of the hypothesized
linear equations. To be safe, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (HC4) were
used for path modeling in the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2017), which has been
recommend as a default standard error construction procedure (Hayes & Cai, 2007).
Linearity was assessed using a scatterplot matrix (Appendix I) and correlation
matrices (Appendix J) sorted by experimental condition. The scatterplot matrix visually
illustrates the bivariate distribution of data plotted as points and the linear associations
between the variables through a line of best fit. The assumption of linearity is strongest
when the data concentrates around the line of best fit (e.g., negative affect and fear)
(Appendix I). A flat line suggests no linear relationship, whereas a diagonal line indicates
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a positive or negative linear relationship. As a supplement to this visual approach,
correlation matrices provide numerical coefficients of association (Pearson’s r) for the
bivariate associations between the variables across groups (ranging from 0 to 1) (see
Appendix J). Correlations that differ across conditions, such as in the case of negative
affect and environmental policy preferences, indicate group differences in the
relationships between the variables. In the threat-priming conditions, 30 of 36 (83%) of
bivariate correlations were significantly positive (or negative in the case of system
justification). This meant that 6 of 36 (17%) of intercorrelations were not correlated in
either condition (i.e., political orientation and fear; political orientation and empathy; fear
and environmental attitudes; system justification and empathy; donation behavior and
system justification; and donation behavior and perceived injustice). In the control
conditions, only 14 of 36 (39%) of the intercorrelations were significantly positive (or
negative in the case of system justification)—specifically, the emotion variables were no
longer correlated with political attitudes (see Appendix J). These results suggest that the
assumption of linear relationships was satisfied for most variables in the threat
conditions; however, many of these relationships disappeared in the control conditions.
Unique Effects of Emotion
I pre-registered that I would examine the emotional components that emerged
from the principal components analysis, which resulted in components for negative affect
and empathy (see “Measures” section). However, in a supplemental analysis using the
PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2017) for SPSS, I examined the unique contribution of the
adjective item pairs on the dependent variables across experimental conditions (following
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Eadeh & Chang, 2019; see Table 2). When splitting up these adjective pairs as parallel
mediators, I found that anger, anxiety, and empathy positively predicted political attitudes
(except for system justification, which was only negatively related to anxiety). The
adjective item pair for fear, on the other hand, demonstrated a suppression effect on all
the political outcomes (except for general system justification). Therefore, to improve the
interpretably of the negative affect component and avoid statistical suppression, fear was
examined separately from negative affect in the following analyses. Although this was a
deviation from the pre-registered analysis plan, the total effect of all the emotions
predicted all outcomes except for levels of general system justification. This latter finding
suggests that regardless of whether fear was retained or removed from the negative affect
scale, levels of statistical significance would have remained the same.
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Table 1. Indirect Effect Sizes with Confidence Intervals for Mediation: The Effect of
Environmental Threat on Sociopolitical Attitudes through Emotion
Variable

Total

Anger

Disgust

P.O.

.67
[.24, 1.08]

.70
[.16, 1.29]

.19
[-.48, .78]

Env.
Atts.

.43
[.14, .72]

.37
[.06, .71]

Coll.
Act.

1.08
[.75, 1.42]

Donate

Fear

Anxiety

Sadness

Empathy

-.31
[-.65, .01]

.29
[-.09, .70]

-.15
[-.69, .39]

-.06
[-.27, .15]

.10
[-.27, .44]

-.28
[-.48, -.08]

.26
[.04, .46]

-.14
[-.46, .18]

.13
[.001, .25]

.43
[.07, .87]

.38
[-.07, .81]

-.30
[-.57, -.04]

.41
[.11, .71]

-.08
[-.50, .34]

.24
[.08, .39]

.89
[.34, 1.54]

-.02
[-.67, .68]

.16
[-.60, .86]

-.34
[-.83, .04]

.69
[.23, 1.23]

.23
[-.40, .95]

.17
[-.06, .44]

Sys. Just.

-.25
[.57, .05]

-.20
[-.58, .21]

-.34
[-.79, .06]

.14
[-.10, .38]

-.34
[-.65, -.05]

.50
[.12, .88]

-.002
[-.15, .14]

P. Injust.

.46
[.18, .77]

.15
[-.25, .58]

.27
[-.13, .68]

-.09
[-.29, .11]

.32
[.06, .56]

-.22
[-.62, .14]

.05
[-.10, .20]

Note. Variables were measured using 5- or 7-point Likert-type scales, except for
“donate”, which was a binary outcome and appears in log-odds. For each variable, the
emotions were tested as parallel mediators, testing each mediator while accounting for
their shared variance. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval (CI)
for each indirect effect. Effects that appear in bold do not include zero in the 95% CI.
Total = Total Indirect Effect. P.O. = Political Orientation (Conservative to Liberal). Env.
Atts. = Environmental Regulation Attitudes. Coll. Act. = Collective Action Intentions.
Sys. Just. = System Justification. P. Injust. = Perceived Injustice.
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Between-Group Comparisons
Preliminary between-group analyses of variance were conducted to illustrate the
effects of the threat-priming conditions across all the observed variables before
computing the hypothesized models (See Table 3). Mann-Whitney U analyses were
conducted using the statistical computing software JASP (JASP Team, 2019), because it
does not assume homogeneity of variance, which was violated according to Levene’s test.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 suggested that threat would increase liberal responses through
negative affect. As predicted in Hypothesis 1 and 2, there was a significant mean
difference for negative affect (i.e., generalized anger) between the threat conditions and
the comparison conditions such that there was more negative affect in the threat
conditions (M = 3.03; SD = 1.07) than the comparison conditions (M = 1.28; SD = 0.57).
There was also a significant mean difference for empathy between the threat conditions
and the comparison conditions such that there was more empathy in the threat conditions
(M = 3.75; SD = 1.13) than the comparison conditions (M = 2.59; SD = 1.26). However,
the mean difference between threat conditions and the comparison conditions on political
orientation was opposite of what was predicted, such that people were more conservative
in the threat conditions (M = 4.32 ; SD = 1.81) than in the comparison conditions (M =
4.70; SD =1.77). Also, counter to predictions, there were no significant mean differences
between conditions on support for environmental regulation policies (p = .38), collective
action intentions (p = .98), or collective donation behavior (p = .97).
Hypothesis 3 suggested that threat would increase liberal responses by first
decreasing system justification. However, contrary to Hypothesis 3, there was no
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significant mean difference between conditions on system justification (p = .45). This
comparison suggests that Hypothesis 3 may have been incorrectly formulated or reflect
the fact the sample consisted of people who were more liberal and had lower systemjustification overall (See Appendix J). Taken together, these findings suggest that instead
of environmental threat directly increasing system justification, negative affect could
mediate a reduction in levels of system justification. This possibility was tested in the
following section (see “Hypothesis 3” in “Path Analyses”).

Table 2. Independent Samples T-Test (Mann-Whitney U)
95% CI for RankBiserial
Correlation
W

p

Rank-Biserial
Correlation

Lower

Upper

Political Orientation

20183.50

.03

-.12

-.23

-.01

Negative Affect

42859.00 < .001

.86

.83

.89

Fear

35157.50 < .001

.53

.45

.60

Empathy

34542.50 < .001

.50

.42

.58

System Justification

22029.00

.45

-.04

-.15

.07

Perceived Injustice

24088.50

.40

.05

-.06

.16

Environmental Policy Preferences 21868.50

.38

-.05

-.16

.06

Collective Action Intentions

22968.50

.98

-.001

-.11

.11

Collective Donation Behavior

22942.00

.97

-.002

-.11

.11

Note. For the Mann-Whitney test, effect size is given by the rank biserial correlation.
Bold indicates p < .05.
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Path Analyses
For each hypothesis, I first present results for the pre-registered (a priori)
hypotheses. Then, I present supplemental results aimed at explaining some of the
inconsistent effects in the data.
To test Hypothesis 1 and 2, the PROCESS (Hayes, 2017) macro for SPSS was
used for mediation (Model 4) and moderated mediation (Model 59) with 5,000 bootstrap
samples for 95% CI construction, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (HC4),
and mean-centered moderators (i.e., variables that define products). To test Hypothesis 3,
I wrote custom syntax for the PROCESS (Hayes, 2017) macro for SPSS using the same
parameters listed above.
Hypothesis 1
See Figure 2 for an overview of the results for Hypothesis 1 and 2.
A priori. Hypothesis 1 suggested that environmental threat primes would increase
support for environmental regulation policies and liberalism, specifically through
negative affect. As predicted, negative affect mediated the relationship between the threat
(versus comparison) conditions on increased support for environmental regulation
policies (b = .38, 95% CI [0.15, 0.62]) and increased liberal political orientation (b = .65,
95% CI [0.30, 1.00]). Consistent with the between-group comparisons, there was greater
negative affect in the threat (versus comparison) conditions (b = 1.75 95% CI [1.59,
1.91]). Subsequently, there was a positive association between negative affect on
increased liberal political orientation (b = 0.37, 95% CI [0.17, 0.57]) and increased
support for environmental regulation policies (b = 0.21, 95% CI [0.08, .35]). Opposite of
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what was predicted, the direct effect of the threat (versus comparison) conditions resulted
in greater conservativism (b = -1.03, 95% CI [-1.54, -0.53]) and less support for
environmental regulation policies (b = -0.44, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.10]). The total effect (i.e.,
direct effect plus indirect effect) of threat on political orientation was negative (b = -0.38,
95% CI [-0.73, -0.04]) whereas the total effect of threat on support for environmental
regulation policies was nearly zero (b = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.28, -0.14]).
Supplemental. The following analyses were conducted to better understand why
the indirect effects were inconsistent with the direct effects, which led to testing whether
the inconsistency was still present when (a) fear and empathy were added as mediators of
threat and political attitudes (in addition to negative affect), (b) political orientation was
examined as a covariate, and (c) political orientation or empathy were added as
moderators of the direct or indirect effects.
First, negative affect, fear, and empathy were examined as parallel mediators of
perceived threat and policy preferences. Negative affect mediated perceived threat and
greater support for environmental regulation policies (b = 0.67, 95% CI [0.26, 1.12]),
whereas fear mediated perceived threat and less support for these policies (b = -0.23,
95% CI [-0.42, -0.05]) and empathy had no effect on policy preferences (b = 0.08, 95%
CI [-0.03, 0.20]). The direct effect of threat was negative and resulted in less policy
support (b = -0.59, 95% CI [-0.98, -0.21]), whereas the total effect was nearly zero and
statistically nonsignificant (b = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.28, 0.14]). However, when controlling
for political orientation, only empathy mediated perceived threat and greater support for
environmental regulation policies (b = 0.13, 95% CI [0.03, 0.23]) compared to negative
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affect (b = 0.28, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.65]) and fear (b = -0.13, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.01]).
Controlling for political orientation also resulted in a nonsignificant direct effect (b = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.53, 0.13]) and did not change the total effect (nonsignificant),
suggesting that political orientation may explain why perceived threat was associated
with less support environmental regulation policies.
Second, negative affect, fear, and empathy were examined as parallel mediators of
perceived threat and political orientation. Negative affect mediated perceived threat and
greater self-reported liberalism (b = 1.18, 95% CI [0.37, 1.21]), whereas fear mediated
perceived threat and less self-reported conservatism (b = -0.57, 95% CI [-0.42, -0.007])
and empathy had no effect on political orientation (b = -0.13, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.06]). The
direct effect (b = -1.16, 95% CI [-1.73, -0.60]) and total effect (b = -0.38, 95% CI [-0.04,
-0.21]) of threat was negative and resulted in greater self-reported conservatism.
Third, political orientation was examined as a moderator of threat and policy
preferences. Political orientation moderated the mediation paths for the effect of threat on
increased support for environmental regulation policies via negative affect, such that the
indirect effect was only significant for participants who were more conservative (16th
percentile) (b = 0.53, 95% CI [0.04, 1.23]) compared to those who were more moderate
(50th percentile) (b = 0.27, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.65]) and more liberal (84th percentile) (b =
0.14, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.64]). Political orientation also moderated the mediation paths for
the effect of threat on decreased support for environmental regulation policies via fear,
such that the indirect effect was only significant for participants who were more moderate
(b = -0.16, 95% CI [-0.32, -0.01]) compared to those were more conservative (b = -0.16,
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95% CI [-0.49, 0.11]) and more liberal (b = -0.16, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.02]). Moreover,
political orientation moderated the mediation paths for the effect of threat on increased
support for environmental regulation policies via empathy, such that the indirect effect
was only significant for participants who were more moderate (b = 0.13, 95% CI [0.04,
0.23]) and more liberal (b = 0.12, 95% CI [0.01, 0.25]) compared to those who were
more conservative (b = 0.13, 95% CI [-0.003, 0.28]). Political orientation did not,
however, moderate the direct effect of perceived threat on changes in policy preferences
(i.e., all CIs included zero).
Fourth, empathy was examined as a moderator of threat and political outcomes.
When examining empathy as moderator and controlling for political orientation, empathy
did not moderate the indirect effect of threat on support for environmental regulation
policies via negative affect or fear (i.e., all CIs included zero). However, empathy did
moderate the indirect effect of threat on greater liberal political orientation via negative
affect, such that the indirect effect was only significant for participants who were more
empathetic (84th percentile) (b = 2.33, 95% CI [1.47, 3.14]) and moderately empathetic
(50th percentile) (b = 1.10, 95% CI [0.51, 1.67] compared to those who were less
empathetic (16th percentile) (b = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.67, 0.36]). Empathy also moderated
the indirect effect of threat on lower liberal political orientation via fear, such that the
indirect effect was only significant for participants who were more empathetic (b = -0.70,
95% CI [-1.12, -0.33] compared to those who were moderately empathetic (b = -0.33,
95% CI [-0.52, 0.03]) and less empathetic (b = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.18]).
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Hypothesis 2
See Figure 2 for an overview of the results for Hypothesis 1 and 2.
A priori. Hypothesis 2 suggested that environmental threat primes would increase
collective action intentions and collective donation behavior through negative affect. As
predicted, negative affect mediated the relationship between the threat (versus
comparison) conditions on increased collective action intentions (b = 1.03, 95% CI [0.77,
1.31]) and increased collective donation behavior (indirect effect in log-odds = 0.93, 95%
CI [0.50, 1.43]; +72% probability). Again, there was greater negative affect in the threat
conditions (B = 1.75 95% CI [1.59, 1.91]). There was a positive association between
negative affect and greater collective action intentions (B = 0.59, 95% CI [0.44, 0.74])
and greater collective donation behavior (B = 0.53, 95% CI [0.28, 0.78]). The direct
effect of the threat (versus comparison) conditions resulted in less collective action
intentions (B = -1.05, 95% CI [-1.44, -0.66]) and less collective donation behavior (B = 0.98, 95% CI [-1.61, -0.34]). The total effect (i.e., direct effect plus indirect effect) of
threat on collective action intentions was nearly zero (b = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.26])
and no total effect was available for donation behavior.
Supplemental. As with Hypothesis 1, the following analyses were conducted to
better understand why the indirect effects were inconsistent with the direct effects.
First, negative affect, fear, and empathy were examined as parallel mediators of
perceived threat and system-challenging collective action intentions. Negative affect (b =
1.26, 95% CI [0.75, 1.76]) and empathy (b = 0.18, 95% CI [0.03, 0.34]) mediated
perceived threat and greater collective action intentions, whereas fear mediated perceived
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threat and less collective action intentions (b = -0.23, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.01]). The direct
effect was negative and resulted in less collective action intentions (b = -1.22, 95% CI [1.66, -0.78]) whereas the total effect was nearly zero and not statistically significant (b =
-0.02, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.26]). However, when controlling for political orientation, only
negative affect (b = 0.83, 95% CI [0.41, 1.28]) and empathy (b = 0.23, 95% CI [0.10,
0.37]) mediated perceived threat and greater collective action intentions, whereas fear no
longer mediated this effect (b = -0.13, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.06]). Also, when controlling for
political orientation, the direct effect of perceived threat on collective action intentions
remained negative (b = -0.79, 95% CI [-1.18, -0.40]) but the direction of the total effect
was unaffected and remained nonsignificant (b = 0.14, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.38]).
Second, negative affect, fear, and empathy were examined as parallel mediators of
perceived threat and collective donation behavior. Only negative affect mediated
perceived threat and greater collective donation behavior (b = 1.05, 95% CI [0.75, 1.76]),
whereas fear (b = -0.15, 95% CI [-0.51, 0.18]) and empathy (b = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.04,
0.41]) resulted in nonsignificant mediation. The direct effect of threat was negative and
resulted in less collective donation behavior (b = -1.13, 95% CI [-1.82, -0.44]). These
patterns of findings remained consistent and statistically significant, even when
controlling for political orientation. Again, negative affect mediated perceived threat and
greater collective donation behavior (b = 0.90, 95% CI [0.19, 1.76]) whereas fear (b = 0.11, 95% CI [-0.48, 0.23]) and empathy (b = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.43]) resulted in
nonsignificant mediation. In addition, the direct effect was negative and resulted in less
collective donation behavior (b = -0.98, 95% CI [-1.68, -0.27]).
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Third, political orientation was examined as moderator of threat and political
outcomes. Political orientation did not moderate the mediation paths for the effect of
threat on greater collective action intentions via negative affect. More precisely, this
indirect effect was positive and significant for participants who were more conservative
(16th percentile) (b = 0.86, 95% CI [0.16, 1.76]), more moderate (50th percentile) (b =
0.88, 95% CI [0.47, 1.32]), and more liberal (84th percentile) (b = 0.87, 95% CI [0.31,
1.40]). Political orientation did however moderate the mediation paths for the effect of
threat on less collective action intentions via fear, such that the indirect effect was only
significant for participants who were more liberal (b = -0.31, 95% CI [-0.56, -0.09]) and
more moderate (b = -0.21, 95% CI [-0.41, -0.03]) compared to those who were more
conservative (b = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.39, 0.50]). Political orientation also moderated the
mediation paths for the effect of threat on greater collective action intentions via
empathy, such that the indirect effect was only significant for participants who were more
liberal (b = 0.34, 95% CI [0.17, 0.54]) and more moderate (b = 0.28, 95% CI [0.15,
0.42]) compared to those who were more conservative (b = 0.13, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.31]).
Political orientation did not however moderate the direct effect of perceived threat on
collective action intentions. More precisely, the direct effect was negative and significant
for participants who were more conservative (16th percentile) (b = -0.80, 95% CI [-1.50, 0.10]), more moderate (50th percentile) (b = -0.83, 95% CI [-1.22, -0.43]), and more
liberal (84th percentile) (b = -0.84, 95% CI [-1.33, -0.35]).
Political orientation did, however, moderate the mediation paths for the effect of
threat on greater collective donation behavior via negative affect, such that the indirect
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effect was significant for participants who were more conservative (16th percentile) (b =
1.80, 95% CI [0.77, 3.70]) compared to those who were more moderate (50th percentile)
(b = 0.77, 95% CI [-0.04, 1.78]) and more liberal (84th percentile) (b = 0.27, 95% CI [0.87, 1.50]). Political orientation did not however moderate the mediation paths for the
effect of threat on collective donation behavior via fear, where the indirect effect was not
statistically significant for participants who were more conservative (b = -0.49, 95% CI [1.45, 0.15]), more moderate (b = -0.09, 95% CI [-0.50, 0.28]), and more liberal (b = 0.05,
95% CI [-0.43, 0.53]). Political orientation did, however, moderate the indirect effect of
threat on greater collective donation behavior via empathy, such that the indirect effect
was only significant for participants who were more liberal (b = 0.39, 95% CI [0.06,
0.80]) and more moderate (b = 0.28, 95% CI [0.04, 0.57]) compared to those who were
more conservative (b = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.28, 0.33]). Moreover, political orientation
moderated the direct effect of threat on less collective donation behavior, such that the
direct effect was only significant for participants who were more conservative (b = -1.37,
95% CI [-2.58, -0.16]) and more moderate (b = -0.87, 95% CI [-1.62, -0.12]) compared
to those who were more liberal (b = -0.70, 95% CI [-1.63, 0.23]).
Third, empathy was examined as a moderator of threat and political outcomes.
When controlling for political orientation, empathy did moderate the indirect effect of
threat on greater collective action intentions via negative affect, such that the indirect
effect was only significant for participants who were more empathetic (84th percentile) (b
= 1.00, 95% CI [0.46, 1.59]) and moderately empathetic (50th percentile) (b = 0.79, 95%
CI [0.41, 1.23] compared to those who were less empathetic (16th percentile) (b = 0.35,

53
95% CI [-0.01, 0.84]). Empathy did not, however, moderate the indirect effect of threat
on collective action intentions via fear (i.e., all CIs included zero).
Similarly, when controlling for political orientation, empathy moderated the
indirect effect of threat on greater collective donation behavior via negative affect, such
that the indirect effect was only significant for participants who were more empathetic
(84th percentile) (b = 1.77, 95% CI [0.56, 3.28]) and moderately empathetic (50th
percentile) (b = 0.80, 95% CI [0.11, 1.62] compared to those who were less empathetic
(16th percentile) (b = -0.16, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.31]). Empathy did not moderate the indirect
effect of threat on collective donation behavior via fear (i.e., all CIs included zero).
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Figure 2. Overview of Results for Hypothesis 1 and 2

Note. The (+) sign indicates a positive relationship, whereas the (-) sign indicates a
negative relationship. Gray boxes indicate groups of variables affected by the mediators.
Moderation of the bold variables by political orientation is shown below the mediators.
Hypothesis 3
See Figure 3 for an overview of the results for Hypothesis 3.
A priori. Hypothesis 3 suggested that environmental threat primes would increase
self-reported liberalism, support for environmental regulation, collective action
intentions, and collective donation behavior—and this effect would be mediated by less
system justification (moderated by empathy), greater perceived injustice, and greater
negative affect (see Figure 1). Author-generated syntax for the PROCESS (Hayes, 2017)
macro for SPSS was used to specify the mediators, moderators, and outcomes in
Hypothesis 3, for example, “process y=PO/m = SysJust PInjust
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NegAffect_NF/x=threat/w=Empathy/bmatrix = 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1/wmatrix=1, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0/hc=4/center=2/boot=5000.”.
As was evident from the absence of a between-groups effect of perceived threat
on system justification, there were no significant indirect effects of threat on any of the
political attitude or action outcomes through the hypothesized order of mediators (i.e.,
system justification [moderated by empathy], perceived injustice, and negative affect)
(see Figure 4). Again, inconsistent with these indirect effects, the direct effects of threat
on political orientation, collective action intentions, and collective donation behavior
were negative, indicating more conservative system-justifying beliefs. In addition, the
direct effect of threat on support for environmental regulation policies was insignificant,
also indicating inconsistent mediation effects.
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Figure 3. Regression Path Model Assessing Hypothesis 3 (A Priori)

Note. Effect sizes appear as unstandardized regression coefficients. Empathy was mean
centered. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval (CI) for each
effect. Significant effects appear in bold—effects were flagged as significant if they did
not contain zero within a 95% CI or if p < .05 (for the f-test for the model R2).
Supplemental. The indirect effects may not have been significant for Hypothesis 3
due to the order of the mediating variables. The first part of the post-hoc reformulation of
Hypothesis 3 suggested that the threat of environmental pollution would increase selfreported liberalism, support for environmental regulation, collective action intentions,
and collective donation behavior (mediated by greater negative affect [moderated by
empathy], greater perceived injustice, and less system justification). Author-generated
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syntax for the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2017) for SPSS was also used to specify the
mediators, moderators, and outcomes relevant to the Hypothesis 3 (post-hoc, part 1), for
example, “process y=PO/m = NegAffect_NF PInjust SysJust
/x=threat/w=Empathy_Scale/bmatrix = 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1/wmatrix=1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0/hc=4/center=2/boot=5000.”.
As expected, there were significant indirect effects for Hypothesis 3 (post-hoc,
part 1), such that the threat of environmental pollution increased self-reported liberalism,
support for environmental regulation policies, and collective action intentions through
more negative affect (moderated by empathy), more perceived injustice, and less system
justification (see Figure 4). These findings provided some post-hoc support for
Hypothesis 3, although the direct effects were still inconsistent with the indirect effects
(i.e., negative or nonsignificant) (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Regression Path Model Assessing Hypothesis 3 (Post-Hoc, Part 1)

Note. Effect sizes appear as unstandardized regression coefficients. Empathy was mean
centered. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval (CI) for each
effect. Dashed lines show all significant mediation effects in the model—nonsignificant
effects were suppressed for graphical clarity. Significant effects appear in bold—effects
were flagged as significant if they did not contain zero within a 95% CI or if p < .05 (for
the f-test for the model R2).
Because the direct effects for Hypothesis 3 (post-hoc, part 1) were inconsistent
with the indirect effects, the second part of the post-hoc reformulation of Hypothesis 3
attempted to address these inconsistencies by adding political orientation as a predictor
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variable rather than as an outcome variable in the model. More precisely, the second part
of the post-hoc reformulation of Hypothesis 3 suggested that the threat of environmental
pollution would increase support for environmental regulation, collective action
intentions, and collective donation behavior (mediated by more negative affect
[moderated by empathy], more perceived injustice, less system justification, and more
self-reported liberalism). Author-generated syntax for the PROCESS (Hayes, 2017)
macro for SPSS was used to specify the mediators, moderators, and outcomes relevant to
Hypothesis 3 (post-hoc, part 2), for example, “process y=EnvAtts/m = NegAffect_NF
PInjust SysJust PO/ x=threat/ w=Empathy_Scale / bmatrix = 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1/ wmatrix=1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0/hc=4/center=2/boot=5000.”.
As expected, the threat of environmental pollution increased support for
environmental regulation and collective action intentions (mediated by more negative
affect [moderated by empathy], more perceived injustice, less system justification, and
more self-reported liberalism) (see Figure 5). Consistent with the previous results, the
threat of environmental pollution did not increase collective donation behavior through
these mediators; however, greater negative affect did mediate this relationship. In
addition, the directs effects remained inconsistent with the indirect effects in this
reformulated model (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Regression Path Model Assessing Hypothesis 3 (Post-Hoc, Part 2)

Note. Effect sizes appear as unstandardized regression coefficients. Empathy was mean
centered. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval (CI) for each
effect. Dashed lines show all significant mediation effects in the model—nonsignificant
effects were suppressed for graphical clarity. Significant effects appear in bold—effects
were flagged as significant if they did not contain zero within a 95% CI or if p < .05 (for
the f-test for the model R2). Env. Threat = Environmental Threat. Support for Env.
Regulation = Support for Environmental Regulation.
Because the direct and indirect effects for Hypothesis 3 (post-hoc, part 2)
remained inconsistent, political orientation was examined as a moderator of the direct
effects of threat on political outcomes and the indirect mediation paths.
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Political orientation did not moderate the direct effect of perceived threat on
policy preferences, although this effect trended toward less support for environmental
regulation for conservatives. More precisely, the direct effect was not significant for
participants who were more conservative (b = -0.20, 95% CI [-0.70, 0.30]), more
moderate (b = -0.04, 95% CI [-0.36, 0.28]), and more liberal (b = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.41,
0.44]). Political orientation only moderated the partial indirect effect of perceived threat
on greater support for environmental regulation through negative affect and perceived
injustice, such that the effect was only significant for participants who were more
conservative (b = 0.15, 95% CI [0.05, 0.27]) and more moderate (b = 0.10, 95% CI
[0.02, 0.19]) compared to those who were more liberal (b = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.16]).
Political orientation did not moderate the direct effect of perceived threat on
collective action intentions, although this effect trended toward less intentions for
conservatives. More precisely, this direct effect was negative and significant for
participants who were more conservative (b = -0.84, 95% CI [-1.45, -0.24]), more
moderate (b = -0.63, 95% CI [-0.95, -0.31]), and more liberal (b = -0.56, 95% CI [-0.92, 0.19]). Political orientation only moderated the partial indirect effect of perceived threat
on greater support for environmental regulation through negative affect and perceived
injustice, such that the indirect effect was only significant for participants who were more
moderate (b = 0.08, 95% CI [0.01, 0.18]) compared to those who were more liberal (b =
0.04, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.16]) and more conservative (b = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.18]).
Political orientation did moderate the direct effect of perceived threat on less
collective donation behavior, and this effect resulted in no negative direct effect for
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liberals. More precisely, this direct effect was negative and significant for participants
who were more conservative (b = -1.23, 95% CI [-2.37, -0.09]) and more moderate (b = 0.77, 95% CI [-1.44, -0.10]) but not for those who were more liberal (b = -0.62, 95% CI
[-1.43, 0.20]). Political orientation did not moderate the indirect effects of threat on
collective donation behavior (i.e, all CIs included zero) beyond the finding that the
indirect of threat on greater donation behavior (through negative affect) only held for
individuals who were more conservative (see “Hypothesis 2” in this section).
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CHAPTER FOUR:
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine whether system-level
appraisals would mediate a liberal-shift in response to environmental threat. First, the
study aimed to replicate the threat-affordance model, which showed a liberal-shift in
responses (i.e., self-reported liberalism; support for environmental regulation policies) to
environmental threat through negative affect (Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2), and to
extend this paradigm to include outcomes related to system-challenging collective action.
More importantly, the goal was to integrate the threat-affordance model with system
justification theory, such that a liberal-shift in responses would be mediated by less
system justification (moderated by empathy), more perceived injustice, and more
negative affect. This hypothesis suggests that certain threats do not necessarily predict
increased system justification or conservatism, which runs counter to predictions made by
system justification theory (see Jost, Stern et al., 2017).
The present study was partially successful at replicating Eadeh and Chang (2019,
Study 2) and integrating the threat-affordance model with SJT. The threat of
environmental pollution increased liberal responses and system change intentions through
negative affect, and this effect was further explained by empathy (as a moderator of
negative affect) and through system-level appraisals (i.e., more perceived injustice and
less system justification; in order). However, the order of significant mediators described
above was exploratory and not the order that was predicted. In addition, only negative
affect mediated the effect of threat on increased donations. Therefore, I attempt to explain
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(a) why the hypothesized synthesis model did not fit the data and (b) why system-level
appraisals did not predict collection donation behavior. Further, despite these significant
indirect effects, there were no direct effects of perceived threat on increased liberalism,
support for environmental regulation policies, system-challenging collective action
intentions, or collective donation behavior. In fact, perceived threat increased selfreported conservatism as opposed to self-reported liberalism. Therefore, I offer several
explanations to better understand these inconsistencies between the indirect and direct
effects, specifically (a) inconsistent mediation due to opposing mediators, (b) moderation
due to political orientation and empathy, and (c) limited statistical power to detect the
effect of threat on political orientation. Last, I discuss the theoretical and practical
implications of these findings.
Model Fit
Hypothesis 3 suggested that the threat of pollution would increase liberal
responses through lower system justification (moderated by empathy), greater perceived
injustice, and greater negative affect. However, the current data did not fit the original
formulation of Hypothesis 3 (Figure 3) and only when the variables were reordered
(Figure 4 and 5) were three out of the four outcomes significant. Instead, there was
evidence of affective versus cognitive primacy in response to the threat of environmental
pollution. However, this primacy may simply be statistical artifact. In a cross-sectional
design, such as in this study, these indirect effects are correlational and derive from a
priori hypotheses about the direction of the relationships.
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The theory for the original formulation of Hypothesis 3 was derived from
Osborne et al. (2019) who suggested that, under threat, system justification and perceived
injustice proceed emotional responses and collective action tendencies. However, their
validation of this model was entirely correlational model in the sense that there were no
experimental conditions (only known-group comparisons). In the present research, there
was an experimental stimulus (i.e., environmental threat). Eadeh and Chang (2019) found
this experimental paradigm to impact current emotional states. In addition, emotion was
measured before any of the cognitive attitude variables. Therefore, phenomenologically,
these effects may be a function of the design or it may be that emotions are proximate
and conceptually related to the threat prime, which may modulate more distal and
abstract political constructs (e.g., political orientation). In addition, perceived injustice
(e.g., how much corporate polluters and the government care about pollution harming
people) may proceed system justification and political orientation because it is more
conceptually related to the threat prime (i.e., is about pollution).
Given these considerations, it is not entirely surprising that the hypothesized
model did not fit the data. The order of the variables should be interpreted with caution,
as they represent correlations, and future research should validate them. Further research
should also try to examine the phenomenological unfolding of these processes by
examining the (a) fine-grained change in emotion and cognition in response to threat over
time using methods such as beta-blockers, fMRI, or a talk-aloud protocol; and (b) coursegrained change of emotion and cognition in response to threat over time using a
longitudinal design. For example, in one longitudinal study, natural disaster increased

66
recalled threat intensity over time and hindered improvement of PTSD symptoms (Heir et
al., 2009). In addition, during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, conservatives, but not liberals,
who were closely affected by the attacks showed increased chronic health issues
(Bonanno & Jost, 2007).
Belief-Behavior Gap
System justification failed to predict collective donation behavior. In other words,
no matter how much participants began to challenge the system under threat, they did not
significantly change the way they donated. Only through negative affect were the odds of
donation greater in the threat (versus control) conditions. However, it was assumed that
donating was symbolic of challenging the system and that not donating was symbolic of
justifying the system. This assumption, however, did not hold up in the bivariate
correlations (i.e., there was no correlation between system justification and donation
behavior; Appendix J). One possible systems-level explanation for this lack of correlation
is that participants may have not seen charitable organizations as mitigating the harm of
corporate polluters or the government, because the charitable organization does not
directly address the proximate cause of the threat. Future studies may find it useful to
include measures that check researchers’ assumptions about how participants view social
systems, especially if they are ancillary to the primary systems of interest.
A more practical explanation for the lack of association between system
justification and donation behavior is that MTurk workers were motivated to earn an
extra 25 cents, and this motivation was stronger than their willingness to donate due to
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diminished system justification. In other words, participants’ may have had personal or
economic justifications that influenced their behavior more than their system needs.
Another possible reason why negative affect, but not system justification, was
associated with greater donation behavior is that participants experienced self-other
overlap, felt negative affect, and were motivated to reduce this negative affect by
donating (Neuberg et al., 1997). In other words, participants may have donated in order to
upregulate their emotions after perceiving threat, which led to feeling a “warm glow”. If
this assumption were true, negative affect should be reduced and positive affect should
increase after donation task.
These latter two possibilities suggest that researchers should evaluate multiple
motives in system justification models relevant to prosocial behavior (e.g., egotism,
altruism, collectivism, and principalism; Batson et al., 2011).
Inconsistencies in the Results
Hidden Mediators
Following Eadeh and Chang (2019), I predicted that negative affect (mainly anger
and disgust) would be mediate environmental threat and liberal responses. Eadeh and
Chang did not find fear to mediate threat and political attitudes. In addition, although they
measured positive emotions, they did not measure empathy. In the current study, both
negative affect and empathy tended to mediate opposite responses to threat (increasing
liberal responses) compared to fear (increasing conservative responses). Hence, these
emotions were inconsistent mediators. Inconsistent mediation occurs when “at least one
mediated effect has a different sign than other mediated or direct effects in a model”

68
(MacKinnon et al., 2007, p. 8). But despite the inconsistent mediation, the overall indirect
effects were positive (i.e., increasing liberalism), and overall, the direct effects were
negative (i.e., increasing conservatism), suggesting that fear alone could not account for
the inconsistencies between the indirect and direct effects.
Other unobserved variables may help account for these inconsistencies.
Specifically, reactions such as feeling “skeptical”, “manipulated”, “tricked”, or
“suckered” may help account for the conservative-shift. For example, one participant
wrote, “It's sad when someone dies young, but you don't get assume that this appeal to
emotion is actually true and then try to make policy based on that [sic].” This participant
also indicated being “very conservative”. This type of reaction may also be due to
solution aversion among conservatives. For example, Campbell and Kay (2014) found
that conservatives (versus liberals) tend to be solution averse, such that when presented
with a government regulation solution (versus free market friendly solution) to climate
change, they showed less agreement with climate change science. Similarly,
conservatives in the current study may have been solution averse, as they read an article
in favor of environmental regulation. Overall, this possibility implies that that the
variability in response patterns and their additive effects may have contributed to the
overall direct effect. Future studies may benefit from measuring more responses to
threatening stimuli.
Moderation
Hypothesis 1 and 2 predicted that environmental threat would increase liberal
responses through negative affect. These effects may differ across participants’ levels of
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political orientation or their feelings of empathy. In its most basic form, moderation
occurs when the effect of X variable on Y variable (e.g., the effect of perceived threat on
political attitudes) differs across the levels of Z variable (e.g., political orientation or
empathy). However, moderation can also occur across indirect effect pathways, such as
the effect of perceived threat on negative affect and the effect of negative affect on
political attitudes. Both types of moderation were examined in the current study.
The supplemental moderation analyses for Hypothesis 1 and 2 revealed patterns
about the data suggesting that liberals, moderates, and conservatives experienced
different emotional reactions to the perceived threat, which, in turn, led them to orient
toward liberal responses or orient toward conservative responses. Under threat,
conservatives tended to experience a liberal shift through negative affect (except for
showing less collective action intentions), whereas liberals tended to experience a liberal
shift through feelings of empathy. In contrast, liberals and moderates tended to
experience conservative shifts through feelings of fear. As for political orientation
moderating the direct effects of threat on attitudes, conservatives donated less bonus
money, but the remaining direct effects were unaffected by political orientation.
The supplemental moderation analyses for Hypothesis 1 and 2 also revealed
patterns about the data suggesting that people who were less empathetic, moderately
empathetic, or more empathetic experienced different emotional reactions to the
perceived threat, which, in turn, led them to orient toward liberal responses or orient
toward conservative responses. Except for policy preferences, empathy moderated the
effects of threat on political orientation, collective action intentions, and donation
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behavior through negative affect and fear. More precisely, people who experienced
moderate to high levels of empathy were more likely to report liberal responses through
negative affect and to report more conservative responses through fear.
These moderation results suggest that both conservatives and liberals experienced
a liberal shift through negative affect and empathy, respectively. However, there was
limited moderation of a conservative-shift across political ideologies, both indirectly and
directly. The results accounted for a conservative shift among liberals through fear
(similar to Nail et al., 2009), and only conservatives became more conservative in the
donation behavior task. Therefore, it remains an empirical possibility that conservatives
became more conservative through a hidden mediator as discussed in the previous section
(e.g., through disbelief, skepticism, or feelings of being manipulated). If evidence for this
possibility is found, the indirect effects may result in a smaller conservative-shift or a
zero-sum direct effect of threat on political attitudes.
Limited Statistical Power
Eadeh and Chang (2019) measured multiple outcomes of threat, including
increased support for support for environmental regulation, increase support for other
liberal policies, increased support for broader political attitudes, and increased liberal
ideological endorsement. This current study was powered to detect the focal outcome: the
direct effect of environmental threat on support for environmental regulation policies
with an effect size of r = .24 (from Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2; see Appendix D).
However, Lakens (2017) argues that researchers should power for the smallest effect of
interest. The present study failed to achieve power for the smallest effect of threat: the
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effect of environmental threat on liberal political orientation (r = -.12, the present study; r
= .20, Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2).
For a two-tailed t-test with 95% power and an effect size of r = -.12, the chance of
detecting this effect in the data is about 39%. For a two-tailed t-test with 95% power and
a mean effect size of r =.16 ([.12 x .20] / 2), the chance of detecting this effect in the data
is about 9%. These power analyses suggest that the effect of threat on political orientation
in the current study, as well as the study by Eadeh and Chang (2019, Study 2) who had
fewer participants, may have been a result of a Type I error, and future replications would
require a larger sample size to detect such an effect. For a two-tailed t-test with 95%
power and an alpha equal to .05, a sample almost twice the size of the current sample (n =
892) would be necessary to detect an effect size of r = -.12.
Theoretical Implications
This article advanced a replication of Eadeh and Chang (2019, Study 2) and a
synthesis of the threat-affordance model with SJT. However, given the inconsistencies in
the results, the model misspecification, and a belief-behavior gap, it is reasonable to
question whether these efforts were successful. To conduct a fair analysis of this
question, I first discuss the empirical findings that were theoretically strong in the current
study. Second, I discuss the findings that were limiting or theoretically inconsistent. Last,
I compare the strong and weak elements of this study and their implications for the goal
of theoretical synthesis.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 suggested that environmental threat would increase liberal
responses through negative affect. The strongest finding that best aligned with
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Hypothesis 1 and 2 was that the threat of environmental pollution resulted in a robust
increase in negative affect (r = .86), and, in turn, negative affect led to increases in selfreported liberalism, support for environmental regulation policies, system-challenging
collective action intentions, and donation behavior. This was a successful replication of
Eadeh & Chang (2019, Study 2) and extension to include a wider variety of outcomes
beyond policy preferences. Hypothesis 3 suggested that, in addition to negative affect,
system-level appraisals would mediate the effect of threat on liberal responses. Indeed, in
addition to negative affect (moderated by empathy), perceived injustice and system
justification mediated the effects of threat on the outcome variables except for donation
behavior (see Figure 4). Moreover, in addition to the aforementioned mediators, selfreported liberalism mediated the effect of threat on support for environmental regulation
policies and collective action intentions (see Figure 5). Although these models were
specified post-hoc, and additional analyses tend to inflate the Type 1 error rate, these
results demonstrate that system-level processes, including lower system justification, may
have mediated the threat of environmental pollution on political attitudes.
In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that environmental threat would increase liberal
ideological endorsement and support for environmental regulation policies (following
Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2). Therefore, the most theoretically inconsistent aspect of
my data was that environmental threat increased self-reported conservatism (r = -.12) and
showed no effect on support for environmental regulation policies (r = -.05). In addition,
when negative affect mediated the effect of threat on the outcome variables, all of the
direct effects were inconsistent (i.e., indicating greater conservatism). In the models with
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system-level variables, this inconsistent direct effect disappeared for support of
environmental regulation policies; however, the effect remained near-zero, rather than
resulting in greater policy support (as found by Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2).
Furthermore, as discussed previously, the original hypothesized model did not fit the
data, and perceived threat only increased donation behavior through negative affect.
These results suggest that there may have been inconsistent mediation, hidden
moderators, or limited statistical power to detect some of the direct effects. System
justification may also be correct in claiming that perceived threat favors increased
political conservatism (Jost, Stern et al., 2017). However, perceived threat did not
directly affect system justification as predicted by Osborne et al. (2019), which suggests
that threat may not directly change levels of system justification as SJT suggests.
With these strengths and limitations taken together, I offer two possible
implications of these findings for theory.
First, the hypothesized theoretical synthesis between the threat-affordance model
and system justification theory may hold true with a larger sample size and a
confirmatory analysis of the post-hoc models. Given the robustness of the effect size of
perceived threat on negative affect compared to political orientation, it may be possible
that the that inconsistent effects were due to concluding there was an effect in the data
when there was no effect in the population. If this explanation is true, then a replication
of this study with a larger sample size (n > 890) should not find effects with inconsistent
directions; in other words, the threat of environmental pollution would increase selfreported liberalism, support for environmental regulation policies, and system-
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challenging collective action. In addition, I would expect that system-level processes,
specifically greater perceived injustice and lower system justification, would mediate
these effects following negative effect. However, this possibility is worth criticizing
given that the study was powered to detect the effect of threat on policy preferences but
failed to find this effect.
Second, it may be possible that neither the threat-affordance model nor SJT can
account for variation in response patterns. This possibility suggests that these theories
should be modified such that they allow for ambiguity and inconsistency between the
direct and indirect effects. In other words, not only will the type of threat increase
liberalism or increases conservativism, but the distribution of observed and unobserved
response patterns in the sample will influence the direction of a political shifts. For
instance, in the current study, negative affect and empathy increased levels of selfreported liberalism, whereas fear increased levels of self-reported conservatism across the
threat conditions. However, there may have been hidden mediators, such as levels of
demoralization, feelings of being manipulated, or motivated disbelief (e.g., Campbell &
Kay, 2014). These hidden mediators may help account for an increased probability of a
conservative shift when people perceive a particular threat.
Limitations and Future Directions
Some limitations have already been discussed, specifically (a) the lack of a casual
design to test the model specification (see “Model Fit”), (b) equating donations to
environmental conservation with system-challenging collective action (see “BeliefBehavior Gap”), (c) the lack of measurement of other potential mediators (e.g., motivated
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disbelief; skepticism; see “Hidden Mediators” in “Inconsistencies in the Results”), and
(d) the limited statistical power to detect an effect of threat on political orientation (see
“Limited Statistical Power” in “Inconsistencies in the Results”). However, there were
several additional limitations in this study that bear on the interpretability of the findings
and conclusions. First, I discuss the limited measurement of (a) positive current
emotional state items, (b) comparative threats, and (c) possible outcomes of interest that
are most sensitive to perceived environmental threat. Then, I discuss the non-random
order in which the affective versus cognitive measures were presented. Last, I discuss
how to improve the methodology of this research paradigm and what novel hypotheses
can be drawn from this research and tested in future studies.
The measurement of negative affect and empathy was necessary, because they
were included in the hypotheses, and they closely replicate the emotion adjectives used
by Eadeh and Chang (2019). However, the measures of emotion in the current study had
fewer items (i.e., adjectives such as fear and anxiety) per emotion (2 vs. 6) and more
negative items than positive items compared to Eadeh and Chang (2019). This decision
was made for the sake of brevity and lessening participant demand, but it also risks
potential demand characteristics for participants to display negative affect and empathy
rather than other positive emotion items (e.g., “happy”). The lack of positive items may
have also clued participants into what emotions the researcher was trying to evoke,
potentially leading those who were more skeptical and conservative to reject the
experimental manipulation. That said, the reliability was quite high for the two item
scales for each emotion, suggesting that that number of items was not a huge issue.
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Eadeh and Chang (2019) originally examined three different types of threats that
increased liberal policy attitudes, and Eadeh (2017) also examined the threat of terrorism,
which increased conservative policy attitudes. In the current study, only one type of
threat was examined: the threat on environmental pollution. However, without examining
different types of the threat that increase both liberal responses and conservative
responses, it is not possible to test the hypothesis that some threats (e.g., corporate greed)
lead to decreased system justification whereas other threats (e.g., terrorism) lead to
increased system justification, especially in a comparable design. Hence, there is limited
ability to draw conclusions from the current study about how system justification is
affected across different types of threats.
Eadeh and Chang (2019) originally examined many different outcomes related to
threat, including support for environmental regulation policies, support for healthcare
regulation policies, support for hawkish military policies, social conservatism, social
liberalism, and ideological self-placement (from liberal to conservative). The current
study only examined two significant outcomes from Eadeh and Chang (2019): support for
environmental regulation and ideological self-placement. However, changing one’s
ideology may represent more stable attitudes that are difficult to change compared to
briefly shifting policy preferences—or motivation to protest or donate—in response to a
perceived threat. In support of this hypothesis, Eadeh and Chang (2019) found that
certain perceived threats reliably increased liberal policy shifts rather than ideological
endorsement (Eadeh & Chang, 2019). Only one of the three types of threats Eadeh and
Chang measured (i.e., environmental pollution) led to an increase in liberal political

77
orientation, a result that was found in an exploratory analysis. Other researchers have also
focused on shifts in attitudes toward policy and voting preferences across political
ideologies, such as in the case of the conservative policy shift after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks (e.g., Nail & McGregor, 2009). However, I took the approach of conceptualizing
policy shifts and ideological endorsement as a set of liberal responses rather than more or
less stable attitudes. This approach is not uncommon. For example, Jost, Stern, and
colleagues (2017) include both ideological and policy-based responses in their metaanalysis of threat on political asymmetries. The current findings showed a main effect of
threat on political ideology rather than policy—or rather, environmental threat led to
greater conservatism and had no direct effect of threat on policy attitudes across political
ideologies. However, given the lack of power to detect the effect of threat on political
orientation, it would be premature to make conclusions about how environmental threat
affects ideological endorsement. Therefore, it remains uncertain the degree to which
perceived threat affects political orientation and whether perceived threat better predicts
policy shift and under what circumstances.
The order in which the measures were completed could have affected
participants’ responses and the order of significant variables in the model. As discussed
previously in the section on model (mis)fit, after the threat-priming article was presented
to the participants, they completed measures of their current emotional state, then
measures of political attitudes. This order was originally used by Eadeh and Chang
(2019) and was also used in the current study. However, it is possible that the
experimental manipulation had the greatest effect on the variables measured closest to the
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manipulation, and that the effect weakened or decayed as the study progressed.
Therefore, one possible reason that the threat-prime had the largest effect on participants’
current emotional state (versus political attitudes) could be due to its primacy to the
threat-prime. This primacy may also weaken the effect of the threat prime on the political
attitude variables. Hence, the order of response measures and potential decay effects may
have influenced which outcomes were most affected by perceived threat.
As discussed in previous sections, future research may benefit from (a) using
methods that can elucidate causality, (b) testing assumptions about the donation paradigm
reflecting collective action motives, (c) measuring possible hidden mediators (e.g.,
solution aversion), and (d) increasing statistical power to detect the small effect of
interest (in this case, perceived threat on political orientation). Based on the additional
limitations discussed in this section, future research may also benefit from (a) balancing
negative emotion items with an equal amount of positive emotion items, (b) adding more
comparative threat conditions, and (c) considering the conditions that lead to ideological
shifts versus policy-oriented shifts to perceived threat. In addition, given that political
orientation can be both modeled as a predictor (moderator or mediator) and outcome it
should be treat as both; however, the effect of perceived threat might be weak and mostly
stable, which means that shifts may only be detected with large sample sizes. In addition,
it may prove to be beneficial to counterbalance the affective and cognitive responses to
reduce order effects, or, in other words, to reduce the chance that the effects are
dependent on the order that the measures were presented in the survey design.
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Given the current findings and limitations, there are several novel hypotheses
researchers could test in future studies. The first hypothesis is based on the exploratory
finding that current emotional state proceeded perceived injustice and system justification
in mediating the effects of perceived threat: Under perceived threat, changes in emotion
statistically (or phenomenologically) may proceed changes in cognition (e.g., perceived
injustice and system justification), and those changes predict political attitudes. The
second hypothesis is based on the inconsistencies between the direct versus indirect
effects of threat on greater conservatism versus greater liberalism, which could include
comparing a couple different possibilities: (1) The threat of pollution indirectly leads to
more liberal responses through emotion (i.e., negative affect and empathy) but directly
leads to more conservative ideological endorsement, or (2) These inconsistencies were
due to (a) insufficient statistical power, (b) hidden moderators (e.g., motivated disbelief
or solution aversion), or (c) moderation of hidden moderators (mainly political
orientation). Future research should also consider how their hypotheses for the political
consequences of perceived threat might differ from hypotheses about the political
consequences of real threats. For example, in one paper, with almost four million
participants, real-life ecological threats (e.g., natural disaster, resource scarcity,
pathogens, warfare, and conflict) predicted increases in cultural tightness, prejudice, and
nationalism (Jackson et al., 2019). This study raises questions as to whether divergent
effects of perceived threat on increased liberal or conservative responses have any
meaningful effect in a world composed of many different threats.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION
Whether or not people challenge the government or other social-political
institutions may have consequential effects on their health and future. For example, the
coronavirus (COVID-19) global viral pandemic was, and as of writing this article, still
remains, a real threat. A lack of concern about the virus could, for example, lead people
to dismiss social distancing policies and further spread the virus. In the United States,
after the stock market crash and a national emergency was declared, concern about
coronavirus has risen to extreme and moderate levels (Civiqs, 2020). However, data also
shows that liberals are far more concerned about the coronavirus than are conservatives
(Civiqs, 2020; Cova & Díaz, 2020). In addition, United States is still lagging behind
countries such as South Korea in “flattening the curve” of confirmed cases and deaths
(Roser et al., 2020). Considering the results of the present study, one path to increase
people’s concern about the virus and bolster prevention measures may occur through
increasing negative affect among conservatives (e.g., anger and disgust about people
contracting the virus and dying unfairly due to incompetent systems and policies),
increasing empathy among liberals, and decreasing fear among liberals and moderates.
This article began with the story about the death of Ella Kissi-Debrah and the role
air pollution played in the decline of her health. Ella’s mother insisted that Britain’s High
Court take action against the pollution and that people feel angry. These types of feelings
and action may in fact spur action toward system-level changes, because people can and
do leverage political institutions for purposes of threat-mitigation. The participants in the
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present study also felt negative affect—including anger—when they read stories similar
to the story about Ella Kissi-Debrah’s death. When participants felt upset or empathetic
about air or water pollution harming a child, they reported more liberalism and were
more likely to challenge sociopolitical systems and donate more cash to environmental
conservation. In addition to the activation of these moral emotions, a heightened
perception of injustice and a reduction in system justification predicted more liberal,
system-challenging responses to the threat of environmental pollution. However, due to
inconsistencies between the direct and indirect effects, it is not clear whether the threat of
pollution favors increased liberalism or conservatism. Future research on people’s
political responses to threat may benefit by not only paying attention to the type of threat
but by paying attention to people’s diverging emotional and cognitive responses to threat.

82
REFERENCES
Aarts, A. A., & Lin, S. C. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science.
Science, 349(6251), 943–950. https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5257
Adler, N. E., Epel, E. S., Castellazzo, G., & Ickovics, J. R. (2000). Relationship of
subjective and objective social status with psychological and physiological
functioning: Preliminary data in healthy, white women. Health Psychology, 19(6),
586–592. https://doi.org/10.1037//0278-6133.19.6.586
Batson, C. D., Ahmad, N., & Stocks, E. L. (2011). Four forms of prosocial motivation:
Egoism, altruism, collectivism, and principlism. In D. Dunning (Ed.), Frontiers of
social psychology. Social motivation (p. 103–126). Psychology Press.
Batson, C. D., Kennedy, C. L., Nord, L. A., Stocks, E. L., Fleming, D. Y. A., Marzette,
C. M., Lishner, D. A., Hayes, R. E., Kolchinsky, L. M., & Zerger, T. (2007).
Anger at unfairness: Is it moral outrage? European Journal of Social Psychology,
37(6), 1272–1285. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.434
Becker, J. C., Tausch, N., & Wagner, U. (2011). Emotional consequences of collective
action participation: Differentiating self-directed and outgroup-directed emotions.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(12), 1587–1598.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211414145
Becker, J. C., & Wright, S. C. (2011). Yet another dark side of chivalry: Benevolent
sexism undermines and hostile sexism motivates collective action for social
change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(1), 62–77.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022615
Bonanno, G. A., & Jost, J. T. (2007). Conservative shift among high-exposure survivors
of the September 11th terrorist attacks. Basic and Applied Social Psychology,
28(4), 311–323. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp2804_4
Brandt, M. J., Turner-Zwinkels, F. M., Karapirinler, B., van Leeuwen, F., Bender, M.,
van Osch, Y., & Adams, B. G. (2019). Threat and politics across countries.
PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/e9uk7
Buchanan, E. M., & Scofield, J. E. (2018). Methods to detect low quality data and its
implication for psychological research. Behavior Research Methods, 50(6), 2586–
2596. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-018-1035-6
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A
new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 6(1), 3–5. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393980

83
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Feng Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need
for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13
Campbell, T. H., & Kay, A. C. (2014). Solution aversion: On the relation between
ideology and motivated disbelief. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
107(5), 809–824. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037963
Choma, B. L., Hafer, C. L., Dywan, J., Segalowitz, S. J., & Busseri, M. A. (2012).
Political liberalism and political conservatism: Functionally independent?
Personality and Individual Differences, 53(4), 431–436.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.04.012
Christian, B. (2019). Mothers Rise Up march: Rosamund Kissi-Debrah whose daughter
died of asthma attack linked to air pollution joins hundreds at London climate
rally. Evening Standard. https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/hundredsmarch-in-central-london-to-demand-action-on-climate-change-a4140316.html
Civiqs. (2020). Coronavirus: Outbreak concern.
https://civiqs.com/results/coronavirus_concern
Cova, F., & Díaz, R. (2020). Individual differences and reactions to the coronavirus
outbreak. Open Science Framework. https://osf.io/497s2/
Crowson, M. H., Debacker, T. K., & Thoma, S. J. (2006). The role of authoritarianism,
perceived threat, and need for closure or structure in predicting post-9/11 attitudes
and beliefs. The Journal of Social Psychology, 146(6), 733–750.
https://doi.org/10.3200/SOCP.146.6.733-750
Day, M. V., & Fiske, S. T. (2017). Movin’ on up? How perceptions of social mobility
affect our willingness to defend the system. Social Psychological and Personality
Science, 8(3), 267–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616678454
Eadeh, F. R. (2017). Healthcare vs. hawkishness: The divergent effects of affect on
context-driven shifts in attitudes. Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/1098
Eadeh, F. R., & Chang, K. K. (2019). Can threat increase support for liberalism? New
insights into the relationship between threat and political preferences. Social
Psychological and Personality Science, OnlineFirst.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550618815919

84
Eidelman, S., & Crandall, C. S. (2009). A psychological advantage for the status quo. In
J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Ed.), Social and Psychological Bases of
Ideology and System Justification (pp. 85–106). Oxford.
http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320916.003.004
Friesen, J. P., Laurin, K., Shepherd, S., Gaucher, D., & Kay, A. C. (2019). System
justification: Experimental evidence, its contextual nature, and implications for
social change. British Journal of Social Psychology, 58(2), 315–339.
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12278
Frijda, N. H., & Mesquita, B. (1998). The analysis of emotions. In M. E. Mascolo & S.
Griffin (Eds.), What Develops in Emotional Development? (pp. 237–295). Plenum
Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-1939-7_11
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The theory of affordances. In The Ecological Approach to Visual
Perception (pp. 127–137). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
https://amzn.com/1848725787
Graham, J. (2009). Missing data analysis: Making it work in the real world. Annual
Review of Psychology, 60(1), 549–576.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085530
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping
the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366–
385. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021847
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2011). Dimensions of moral emotions. Emotion Review,
3(3), 258–260. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073911402388
Hardin, C. D., & Higgins, E. T. (1996). Shared reality: How social verification makes the
subjective objective. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of
motivation and cognition (pp. 28–84). Guilford Press.
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1996-98385-002
Hasson, Y., Tamir, M., Brahms, K. S., Cohrs, J. C., & Halperin, E. (2018). Are liberals
and conservatives equally motivated to feel empathy toward others? Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(10), 1449–1459.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218769867
Hayes, A. F. (2017). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process
Analysis (2nd ed.). Guildford Press. https://amzn.com/1609182308

85
Hayes, A. F., & Cai, L. (2007). Using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error
estimators in OLS regression: An introduction and software
implementation. Behavior Research Methods, 39(4), 709–722.
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03192961
Heir, T., Piatigorsky, A., & Weisæth, L. (2009). Longitudinal changes in recalled
perceived life threat after a natural disaster. British Journal of Psychiatry, 194(6),
510–514. doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.108.056580
Hennes, E. P., Nam, H. H., Stern, C., & Jost, J. T. (2012). Not all ideologies are created
equal: Epistemic, existential, and relational needs predict system-justifying
attitudes. Social Cognition, 30(6), 669–688.
https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.669
Hirsh, J. B., DeYoung, C. G., Xu, X., & Peterson, J. B. (2010). Compassionate liberals
and polite conservatives: Associations of agreeableness with political ideology
and moral values. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(5), 655–
664. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167210366854
Hutcherson, C. A., & Gross, J. J. (2011). The moral emotions: A social-functionalist
account of anger, disgust, and contempt. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 100(4), 719–437. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0022408
Iyer, A., & Leach, C. W. (2009). Helping disadvantaged out‐groups challenge unjust
inequality. In S. Stürmer & M. Snyder, The psychology of prosocial behavior:
Group processes, intergroup relations, and helping (1st ed., pp. 337–353). WileyBlackwell. https://amzn.com/1405178809
Iyer, A., & Ryan, M. K. (2009). Challenging gender inequality in the workplace: Men's
and women's pathways to collective action. Journal of Social Issues, 65, 291 314. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2009.01625.x
Jackson, J. C., von Egmond, M., Choi, V., Ember, C., Halberstadt., Balanovic, J., . . .
Gelfand, M. (2019). Ecological and cultural factors underlying the global
distribution of prejudice. PLOS ONE, 14(9), Article e0221953.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221953
JASP Team. (2019). JASP [Computer software]. https://jasp-stats.org/
Johnson, I. R., & Fujita, K. (2012). Change we can believe in: Using perceptions of
changeability to promote system-change motives over system-justification
motives in information search. Psychological Science, 23(2), 133–
140. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611423670

86
Jost, J. (2015). Resistance to change: A social psychological perspective. Social
Research, 82(3), 607-636. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/603152
Jost, J. T. (2017). Ideological asymmetries and the essence of political psychology.
Political Psychology, 38(2), 167–208. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12407
Jost, J. T. (2019). A quarter century of system justification theory: Questions, answers,
criticisms, and societal applications. British Journal of Social Psychology, 58(2),
263–314. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12297
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system‐justification and
the production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology,
33(1), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1994.tb01008.x
Jost, J. T., Becker, J., Osborne, D., & Badaan, V. (2017). Missing in (collective) action:
Ideology, system justification, and the motivational antecedents of two types of
protest behavior. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(2), 99–108.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417690633
Jost, J. T., Chaikalis-Petritsis, V., Abrams, D., Sidanius, J., van der Toorn, J., & Bratt, C.
(2012). Why men (and women) do and don’t rebel: Effects of system justification
on willingness to protest. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(2), 197–
208. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211422544
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure,
functions, and elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60(1), 307–337.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600
Jost, J. T., Gaucher, D., & Stern, C. (2015). "The world isn't fair": A system justification
perspective on social stratification and inequality. In M. Mikulincer, P. R. Shaver,
J. F. Dovidio, & J. A. Simpson (Eds.), APA handbooks in psychology. APA
handbook of personality and social psychology, Vol. 2. Group processes (p. 317–
340). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/14342-012
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism
as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339–375.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339
Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2003). The psychology of system justification and the
palliative function of ideology. European Review of Social Psychology, 13(1),
111–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280240000046

87
Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of system-justifying
ideologies. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(5), 260–265.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00377.x
Jost, J. T., Ledgerwood, A., & Hardin, C. D. (2008). Shared reality, system justification,
and the relational basis of ideological beliefs. Social and Personality Psychology
Compass, 2(1), 171–186. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00056.x
Jost, J. T., Stern, C., Rule, N. O., & Sterling, J. (2017). The politics of fear: Is there an
ideological asymmetry in existential motivation? Social Cognition, 35(4), 324–
353. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2017.35.4.324
Kahn, D., & Björklund, F. (2020). The intent and extent of collective threats: A datadriven conceptualization of collective threats and their relation to political
preferences. Unpublished manuscript.
Kay, A. C., & Friesen, J. (2011). On social stability and social change: Understanding
when system justification does and does not occur. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 20(6), 360–364.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411422059
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K. (2008). God and the
government: Testing a compensatory control mechanism for the support of
external systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), 18–35.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.18
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Peach, J. M., & Laurin, K. (2009). Inequality, discrimination,
and the power of the status quo: Direct evidence for a motivation to see the way
things are as the way they should be. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 97(3), 421–434. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015997
Kay, A. C., & Jost, J. T. (2003). Complementary justice: Effects of "poor but happy" and
"poor but honest" stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit
activation of the justice motive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
85(5), 823–837. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.823
Kay, A. C., Jost, J. T., & Young, S. (2005). Victim derogation and victim enhancement as
alternate routes to system justification. Psychological Science, 16(3), 240–246.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.00810.x
Keltner, D., & Robinson, R. J. (1997). Defending the status quo: Power and bias in social
conflict. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(10), 1066–1077.
https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672972310007

88
Kruglanski, A. W., Webster, D. M., & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resistance and
openness to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 65(5), 861–876. https://doi.org/10.1037/00223514.65.5.861
Laham, S. M., & Corless, C. (2016). Threat, morality and politics: A differentiated threat
account of moral and political values. In J. P. Forgas, L. Jussim, & P. A. M. van
Lange (Eds.), The social psychology of morality (pp. 56-70). New York, NY:
Routledge. http://amzn.com/B01BC2QPR6
Lakens, D. (2017). How a power analysis implicitly reveals the smallest effect size you
care about. The 20% Statistician. http://daniellakens.blogspot.com/2017/05/howpower-analysis-implicitly-reveals.html
Lambert, A. J., Eadeh, F. R., & Hanson, E. J. (2019). Anger and its consequences for
judgment and behavior: Recent developments in social and political psychology.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 59, 103–173.
https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2018.12.001
Lipkus, I. M. (1991). The construction and preliminary validation of a global belief in a
just world scale and the exploratory analysis of the multidimensional belief in a
just world scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 12(11), 1171–1178.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(91)90081-L
Litman, L., Robinson, J., & Abberbock, T. (2017). TurkPrime.com: A versatile
crowdsourcing data acquisition platform for the behavioral sciences. Behavior
Research Methods, 49(2), 433–442. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-016-0727-z
MacKinnon, D. P., Fairchild, A.J., & Fritz, M.S. (2007). Mediation analysis. Annual
Review of Psychology, 58, 593–614.
Marshall, C. (2018). Illegal levels of air pollution linked to child's death. BBC.
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-44612642
Marshall, C. (2019). Ella Kissi-Debrah 'pollution' death: Backing for new inquest. BBC.
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-46823309
Maxwell, S. E., Kelley, K., & Rausch, J. R. (2008). Sample size planning for statistical
power and accuracy in parameter estimation. Annual Review of Psychology, 59,
537–563. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093735

89
McCall, L., Burk, D., Laperriere, M., & Richeson, J. A. (2017). Exposure to rising
inequality shapes Americans’ opportunity beliefs and policy support. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 11(36), 9593–9598.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1706253114
Mendez, M. F. (2017). A neurology of the conservative-liberal dimension of political
ideology. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 29(2), 86–
94. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.neuropsych.16030051
Milfont, T. L., & Duckitt, J. (2010). The environmental attitudes inventory: A valid and
reliable measure to assess the structure of environmental attitudes. Journal of
Environmental Psychology, 30(1), 80–94.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2009.09.001
Miller, D. A., Cronin, T., Garcia, A. L., & Branscombe, N. R. (2009). The relative impact
of anger and efficacy on collective action is affected by feelings of fear. Group
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 12(4), 445–462.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430209105046
Motyl, M., Demos, A. P., Carsel, T. S., Hanson, B. E., Melton, Z. J., Mueller, A. B.,
Prims, J. P., Sun, J., Washburn, A. N., Wong, K. M., Yantis, C., & Skitka, L. J.
(2017). The state of social and personality science: Rotten to the core, not so bad,
getting better, or getting worse? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
113(1), 34–58. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000084
Nail, P. R., & McGregor, I. (2009). Conservative shift among liberals and conservatives
following 9/11/01. Social Justice Research, 22, 231–240.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-009-0098-z
Nail, P. R., McGregor, I., Drinkwater, A. E., Steele, G. M., & Thompson, A. W. (2009).
Threat causes liberals to think like conservatives. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 45(4), 901–907. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.013
Napier, J. L., & Jost, J. T. (2008). Why are conservatives happier than liberals?
Psychological Science, 19(6), 565–572. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679280.2008.02124.x
Neuberg, S. L., Cialdini, R. B., Brown, S. L., Luce, C., Sagarin, B. J., & Lewis, B. P.
(1997). Does empathy lead to anything more than superficial helping? Comment
on Batson et al. (1997). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(3),
510–516. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.510

90
Newport, F. (2014). Republicans expand edge as better party against terrorism. Gallup
News. https://news.gallup.com/poll/175727/republicans-expand-edge-better-partyagainst-terrorism.aspx
Niezink, L. W., Siero, F. W., Dijkstra, P., Buunk, A. P., & Barelds, D. P. H. (2012).
Empathic concern: Distinguishing between tenderness and sympathy. Motivation
and Emotion, 36(4), 544–549. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-011-9276-z
O’Grady, T., & Vandegrift, D. (2019). Moral foundations and decisions to donate bonus
to charity: Data from paid online participants in the United States. Data in Brief,
25, 104331. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2019.104331
Oppenheim, M. (2019). Ella Kissi-Debrah: Mother wins fight for new inquest into
daughter’s death which she blames on air pollution. The Independent.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/ella-kissi-debrah-inquestdeath-air-pollution-high-court-rosamund-a8896116.html
Osborne, D., Jost, J. T., Becker, J. C., & Badaan, V. (2019). Protesting to challenge or
defend the system? A system justification perspective on collective action.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 49(2), 244–269.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2522
Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2013). Through rose-colored glasses: System-justifying
beliefs dampen the effects of relative deprivation on well-being and political
mobilization. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(8), 991–1004.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213487997
Pena, E. A., & Slate, E. H. (2019). Gvlma: Global validation of linear models
assumptions [R package]. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=gvlma
Petrocik, J. (1996). Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study.
American Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 825–850.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2111797
Pieper, D., Hirano, H., & Harton, H. C. (2020). The effect of environmental threats and
terrorism and violent-crime threats on political orientation and attitudes. Open
Science Framework. https://osf.io/gubcj
Revelle, W. (2019). Psych: Procedures for psychological, psychometric, and personality
research [R package]. Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.
https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=psych.

91
Robertson, R. E., Tran, F. W., Mejia, J., & Mourani, C. (2016). IPtoCountry: Convert IP
addresses to country names or full location with geoplotting [R package].
https://www.r-pkg.org/pkg/IPtoCountry
Roser, M., Ritchie, H., & Ortiz-Ospina, E. (2020). Coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
statistics and research. Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus
Runciman, W. G. (1966). Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of attitudes to
social inequality in twentieth-century England. University of California Press.
https://amzn.com/0710039239
Saad, L. (2007). Democratic party winning on issues. Gallup News.
https://news.gallup.com/poll/103102/democratic-party-winning-issues.aspx
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2015). The unifying moral dyad: Liberals and conservatives
share the same harm-based moral template. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 41(8), 1147–1163. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215591501
Schimmack, U. (2020). A meta-psychological perspective on the decade of replication
failures in social psychology. Replicability Index.
https://replicationindex.com/2020/01/05/the-decade-of-replication-failures-insocial-psychology/
Seeberg, H. B. (2017). How stable is political parties’ issue ownership? A cross-time,
cross-national analysis. Political Studies, 65(2), 475–492.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716650224
Smith, H. J., Cronin, T., & Kessler, T. (2008). Anger, fear, or sadness: Faculty members'
emotional reactions to collective pay disadvantage. Political Psychology, 29(2),
221–246. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00624.x
Spanovic, M., Lickel, B., Denson, T. F., & Petrovic, N. (2010). Fear and anger as
predictors of motivation for intergroup aggression: Evidence from Serbia and
Republika Srpska. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13(6), 725–739.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430210374483
Storbeck, J., & Clore, G. L. (2007). On the interdependence of cognition and emotion.
Cognition & Emotion, 21(6), 1212–1237.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930701438020
Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R. N.
(2011). Explaining radical group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy
routes to normative and nonnormative collective action. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 101(1), 129–148. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022728

92
Thórisdóttir, H., & Jost, J. T. (2011). Motivated closed‐mindedness mediates the effect of
threat on political conservatism. Political Psychology, 32(5), 785–811.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00840.x
Trochim, W. M. K. (2020a). Statistical power. Research Methods Knowledge Base.
https://socialresearchmethods.net/kb/statistical-power/
Trochim, W. M. K. (2020b). What is probabilistic equivalence? Research Methods
Knowledge Base. https://socialresearchmethods.net/kb/probabilistic-equivalence/
Tzuyin Lai, V., Peter, H., & Casasanto, D. (2012). Affective primacy vs. cognitive
primacy: Dissolving the debate. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 243.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00243
Vainio, A., Mäkiniemi, J.-P., & Paloniemi, R. (2014). System justification and the
perception of food risks. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 17(4), 509–
523. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430213503502
van Buuren, S., & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, K. (2011). MICE: Multivariate imputation by
chained equations in R [R package]. Journal of Statistical Software, 45(3), 1–67.
https://www.jstatsoft.org/v45/i03/.
van der Toorn, J., Tyler, T. R., & Jost, J. T. (2011). More than fair: Outcome dependence,
system justification, and the perceived legitimacy of authority figures. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 47(1), 127–138.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.09.003
van Doorn, J., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2014). Anger and prosocial
behavior. Emotion Review, 6(3), 261- 268.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073914523794
van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity
model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three sociopsychological perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 134(4), 504–535.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504
Vargas-Salfate, S., Paez, D., Khan, S. S., Liu, J. H., & Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2018). System
justification enhances well-being: A longitudinal analysis of the palliative
function of system justification in 18 countries. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 57(3), 567–590. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12254

93
Wakslak, C. J., Jost, J. T., Tyler, T. R., & Chen, E. S. (2007). Moral outrage mediates the
dampening effect of system justification on support for redistributive social
policies. Psychological Science 18(3), 267–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679280.2007.01887.x
Waytz, A., Iyer, R., Young, L., & Graham, J. (2016). Ideological differences in the
expanse of empathy. In P. Valdesolo & J. Graham (Eds.), Claremont symposium
on applied social psychology series. Social psychology of political
polarization (p. 61–77). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
http://amzn.com/1138810649
Xie, C., Bagozzi, R. P., & Grønhaug, K. (2015). The role of moral emotions and
individual differences in consumer responses to corporate green and non-green
actions. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 43(3), 333–356.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-014-0394-5
Yentes, R. D., & Wilhelm, F. (2018). Careless: Procedures for computing indices of
careless responding [R package]. https://cran.rproject.org/web/packages/careless/index.html
Zabjek, A. (2019). Thunberg faces counter-rally by workers in Canada's oil heartland.
Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-thunberg/correctedthunberg-faces-counter-rally-by-workers-in-canadas-oil-heartlandidUSL2N2730XF

94
APPENDIX A
INFORMED CONSENT

Informed Consent
Invitation to Participate: You are invited to participate in a research project conducted
through the University of Northern Iowa. The University requires that you give your
agreement to participate in this project. The following information is provided to help
you make an informed decision about whether to participate.
Nature and Purpose: The purpose of this study is to study people’s attitudes on world
events, natural systems, and society.
Explanation of Procedures: In this study, you will be asked to read a short one-page
article, write about your reaction to the article, answer questions about your thoughts and
feelings related to the article, answer question related to social attitudes, and answer
questions about your background (age, gender, and ethnicity). This study is expected to
last 15 minutes. You may discontinue involvement in the study at any time.
Discomfort and Risks: There is minimal anticipated risk involved with participating in
this study. There is chance that the article may contain information some people find
discomforting.
Benefits and Compensation: This study may help us understand how people feel about
attitudes in certain situations, which could be responsible for changes in social processes.
You will be compensated $1.00 for participating for an approved HIT (Human
Intelligence Task). You will receive a secret code at the end of the survey to submit for
your payment.
Confidentiality: No guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data
transmitted electronically; however extreme precaution will be taken to secure your data.
Once the researcher verifies your residence in the United States, all identifying
information (i.e., IP addresses, latitude, and longitude) will be deleted from the data. We
will not report your individual sensitive information to any person or agency. We may
post general location information such as the number of participants in each state of the
country as well as demographic information (e.g., race and gender). The summarized
findings with no identifying information will be published online and may be published
in an academic journal or presented at a scholarly conference.
Right to Refuse or Withdraw: Your participation is voluntary. You are free to withdraw
from participation at any time or to choose not to participate at all, and by doing so, you
will not be penalized or lose benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
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Questions: If you have questions about the study or desire information in the future
regarding your participation or the study generally, you can contact Dylan Pieper at
pieperd@uni.edu or the project investigator’s faculty advisor Nicholas Schwab, Ph.D.
at nicholas.schwab@uni.edu. You can also contact the office of the IRB Administrator,
University of Northern Iowa, at anita.gordon@uni.edu or 319-273-6148, for answers to
questions about the rights of research participants and the participant review process.
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APPENDIX B
POLLUTION CONDITIONS

Two-year-old May Sustain Health Problems Due to Polluted Water Supply
Springfield, Mississippi — Adam Reed knew
that something was wrong when his bubbly,
energetic 2-year-old daughter, Josephine,
suddenly became anxious and irritable all the
time. Reed eventually took his daughter to the
doctor for a blood test. His worries were soon
confirmed when her blood tests revealed that
she was suffering from severe heavy metal
poisoning caused by drinking polluted
Springfield water.
Springfield’s water pollution has been a growing issue in the past decade and has resulted
from toxic sewage spills and industrial waste into the town’s nearby river. The regulation
of toxic pollution has remained lax in the United States. In fact, according to the EPA, 41
states have reported higher than acceptable levels of lead in drinking water in the last
three fiscal years. "We just don’t know what’s going to happen to her," Reed said in an
interview while consoling Josephine. "My daughter’s just a kid. She doesn’t know what’s
going on, and we’re all scared for what comes next.”
Heavy metal poisoning has severe consequences for children younger than six, who can
suffer from organ damage, slowed development, and behavioral problems later in life.
Despite these risks, the privatization of water systems are disserving local communities.
Privatized systems are not only more expensive, but also cut corners, with these negligent
practices resulting in the deterioration of existing infrastructures for the sake of shortterm profit.
Casey Dinges, the senior managing director of the American Society of Civil Engineers,
has stated that the US needs to “seriously invest” in cleaner public water services. Those
investments may include stringent regulations of water cleaning plants and additional
grants to fund the EPA.
The long-term damage to children who are exposed to contaminated water is incredibly
severe. Distraught with his daughter’s condition and the lack of a serious resolution to
Springfield’s pollution problem, Reed has stated, “I want what’s best for my daughter,
but I don’t think these private companies care
From Eadeh and Chang (2019, Study 2)
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12-Year Old Dies of Asthma Attack Caused by Polluting in Evansville, Indiana
Evansville, Indiana — Evansville contains some of
America’s largest coal-fired power plants. These plants
pump out millions of pounds of toxic air pollution, levels
that are comparable to Hong Kong. According to a
Center for Public Integrity investigation, areas like
Evansville contain an extreme concentration of super
polluting coal plants.
This pollution has hit some families particularly hard.
Local 12-year old Kavon Cooper suffered from intense
asthma, which his mother described as “a constant
battle.” He needed medicine to breathe if he stayed in
Evansville too long. His asthma attacks were so severe
that he would sometimes have to be hospitalized.
Because of the severity of his asthma, Kavon stayed
home with the windows closed as much as possible,
often playing video games with the hopes of testing them
for a living someday.
On April 18, 2015, Kavon collapsed and died at home, lying in the hallway by the bathroom
right outside his bedroom. The cause of death was an acute asthma attack. At the time,
Kavon’s family couldn’t understand what had happened. However, it’s no coincidence that
toxic particle and sulfur dioxide levels jumped to extreme levels the morning Kavon died,
according to the air monitor near the Cooper family home. Moreover, after learning about
this spike in pollution, Kavon’s mother realized that his asthma was much better whenever
he left Evansville. She also explained that that “there’s a lot of illness, a lot of sickness in
this area.”
One extreme polluter near Kavon’s area, Gibson, is the fourth-largest coal plant in the
United States, and released 2.9 million pounds of air pollutants in 2014. Much of their
pollution contains sulfuric acid, a lung irritant which the EPA says contributes to the
formation of fine, asthma-related particles. Worse yet, Evansville polluters have used
settlements to install cheaper, less-effective environmental controls rather than address this
dangerous pollution.
These extreme polluters and corner-cutting measures have put local communities in
danger. Kavon’s brother, Kameron, tragically stated in Kavon’s obituary, "I just want my
brother. We just want him back.
From Eadeh and Chang (2019, Study 2)
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APPENDIX C
COMPARISON CONDITIONS
Comparison Condition A
Recent Research Reveals Mysteries of Food Allergies
Food allergies or food
intolerances affect nearly
everyone at some point. People
often have an unpleasant reaction
to something they ate and wonder
if they have a food allergy. One
out of three people either say that
they have a food allergy or that
they modify the family diet because a family member is suspected of having a food
allergy. But only about 5% of children have clinically proven allergic reactions to foods.
In teens and adults, food allergies occur in about 4% of the total population.
This difference between the clinically proven prevalence of food allergy and the public
perception of the problem is in part due to reactions called “food intolerances” rather than
food allergies. A food allergy, or hypersensitivity, is an abnormal response to a food that
is triggered by the immune system. The immune system is not responsible for the
symptoms of a food intolerance, even though these symptoms can resemble those of a
food allergy. For example, being allergic to milk is different from not being able to digest
it properly due to lactose intolerance. It is extremely important for people who have true
food allergies to identify them and prevent allergic reactions to food because these
reactions can cause devastating illness and, in some cases, be fatal.
Food allergies involve two features of the human immune response. One is the
production of immunoglobulin E (IgE), a type of protein called an antibody that
circulates through the blood. The other is the mast cell, a specific cell that occurs in all
body tissues but is especially common in areas of the body that are typical sites of
allergic reactions, including the nose and throat, lungs, skin, and gastrointestinal tract.
The ability of a given individual to form IgE against something as benign as food is an
inherited predisposition. Generally, such people come from families in which allergies
are common – not necessarily food allergies but perhaps hay fever, asthma, or hives.
Someone with two allergic parents is more likely to develop food allergies than someone
with one allergic parent.

From Eadeh and Chang (2019, Study 2)
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Comparison Condition B
Water Treatment Process
Drinking water supplies in the United States
are among the safest in the world. Public
drinking water systems use various methods
of water treatment to provide safe drinking
water for their communities. Today, the most
common steps in water treatment used by
community water systems (mainly surface
water treatment) include:
Coagulation and Flocculation
Coagulation and flocculation are often the
first steps in water treatment. Chemicals with
a positive charge are added to the water. The
positive charge of these chemicals neutralizes
the negative charge of dirt and other
dissolved particles in the water. When this
occurs, the particles bind with the chemicals
and form larger particles, called floc.
Sedimentation
During sedimentation, floc settles to the bottom of the water supply, due to its weight.
This settling process is called sedimentation.
Filtration
Once the floc has settled to the bottom of the water supply, the clear water on top will
pass through filters of varying compositions (sand, gravel, and charcoal) and pore sizes,
in order to remove dissolved particles, such as dust, parasites, bacteria, viruses, and
chemicals.
Disinfection
After the water has been filtered, a disinfectant (for example, chlorine, chloramine) may
be added in order to kill any remaining parasites, bacteria, and viruses, and to protect the
water from germs when it is piped to homes and businesses.
Adapted from the CDC and EPA
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APPENDIX D
POWER ANALYSIS
Replicability of psychological effects is diagnostic of a reliable science. Estimates
of replicability in the social and behavioral science vary from 20% to 70% (Aarts & Lin,
2015; Klein et al., 2018; Schimmack, 2020). Some research suggests that the social and
personality psychology is improving as a science as trends move toward decreasing
questionable research practices (e.g., p-hacking) and increasing best practices (e.g.,
conducting power analyses) (Motyl et al., 2017, cf. Schimmack, 2020).
One way to avoid low replicability and improve psychological science is by
conducting statistical power analyses. Statistical power is the probability to correctly
reject the null hypothesis when it is false, or rather, to detect a probable effect if the effect
does in fact exist in a population (Trochim, 2020a). For example, if a researcher sets their
desired power to 95%, they can calculate the number of participants they need to detect
an effect of a given strength (e.g., r = .30) with your desired alpha (or chance of
concluding that there is an effect in the data when there is no effect in the population;
typically α < .05). High statistical power can be achieved by sample size planning for
significance tests (p > α) for the “smallest effect sizes your care about” (Lakens, 2017) or
sample size planning for accuracy in parameter estimation (AIPE; Maxwell et al., 2008).
A statistical power analysis was conducted for the present study to achieve 95%
statistical power for a difference of means f test (α = .05; see Appendix A). The study
being replicated and extended (Eadeh & Chang, 2019, Study 2) used a statistical power of
80% for sample size calculations and found an effect size η² = .06 (equivalent to r = .24)
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for the effect of environmental threat on support for environmental regulatory policies.
Using this effect size, a power analysis for the current study suggested a sample size of
412 participants. This sample size estimate was increased by 20% to account for planned
exclusions, which meant collecting data from at least 495 participants. This power
analysis procedure was intended to increase the replicability and scientific credibility of
the present findings, especially in the context of social psychology’s replicability crisis.
One limitation of this power analysis is that it did not account other variables in the
model or for mediation or moderation. Power for mediation was not tested because the
effect sizes for indirect effects were unknown. Hence, the following power analysis was a
best-guess estimation based the known effect size of the direct effect.
# R code for power analysis
# Convert the eta-squared to Cohen's f
fes<-sqrt(.06/(1-.06))
fes
library(pwr)
pwr.anova.test(k=2, f=fes, sig.level=0.05, power=.95)
# A one-way ANOVA power analysis suggests 103 participants per condition
# There is a maximum of four between-subject conditions that will be compared,
so multiply by four to get the target sample size:
(103*4)
# Target sample size: 412
# Next, pad this target for the possibility of 20% missing or low-quality data,
rounding up:
ceiling((103*4)+((103*4)*.20))
# Target sample size (with padding): 495
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APPENDIX E
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA

Pre-exclusions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

US only
95% hit approval rate
5000-500,000 approved hits
Block duplicate IPs
Block duplicate geocodes
Block suspicious geocodes

Post-exclusions:
First step
I removed data that meets one or both of the following criteria:
1. Missing all data (1 case removed) [Pre-registered]
2. IP geocoding outside the US (Robertson et al. 2016) (11 cases removed) [Pre-registered]
3. Duplicate IPs—if it appears that the data came from the same person, the second line of
data will be excluded from analyses (1 case removed) [Pre-registered]
Second step
Following Buchanan and Scofield (2018), I removed data that met one or both of the following
criteria:
1. A clicking check (flags participants whose number of mouse clicks count is less than the
number of answered items on a specified Qualtrics page) (0 cases removed) [Preregistered; forgot timer/click-counter]
2. A timing check (flags participants reading two standard deviations faster than average
character reading speeds on a specified Qualtrics page) (34 cases removed) [Preregistered]
Third step
I removed data that met one or more of the following criteria:
1. Age and year born not matching (participants will not be excluded if they omit one or the
other) (16 cases removed) [Pre-registered]
2. Honesty check (if participants answer 2 = A little or 1 = None at all) (2 cases removed)
[Pre-registered]
3. Careless answering via long-string analysis (when a participant is considered an outlier
for the number of times the same response option is used in a row on a conventional
boxplot) (Yentes & Wilhelm, 2018) (3 cases removed) [Pre-registered, with deviation]
○ Because of low variability, outliers were long-string lengths that did not equal 2.
Thus, I only removed long-string lengths that were equal to 8, because with two
reverse coded items, the most items they should have completed a row was 6.
4. Unrelated commentary in their reflection on the article (1 case) [Pre-registered]
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APPENDIX F
SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION SCALE

5-point response scale: from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
Items are reverse scored where there is an *
Instructions: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
1) In general, you find society to be fair.
2) In general, the American political system operates as it should.
3) American society needs to be radically restructured.*
4) The United States is the best country in the world to live in.
5) Most policies serve the greater good.
6) Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness.
7) Our society is getting worse every year.*
8) Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve.

From Kay and Jost (2003)
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APPENDIX G
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PREFERENCES

7-point response scale: from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree
Items are reverse scored where there is an *
Instructions: Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
1. The federal government should aggressively carry out environmental protection
regulations.
2. The federal government has a responsibility to ensure companies are reducing their
pollution levels.
3. Federal funding of the Environmental Protection Agency should be our top
priority, even if it means a reduction in funding for other areas.
4. Private companies should be required, by federal law, to use cleaner energy
solutions.
5. I would support fining coal companies millions of dollars if their actions
contributed to harming local communities
6. I would support the aggressive federal regulation of coal companies.
7. Private companies that cause extreme water pollution should be punished.
8. Private companies that contribute to water pollution should be aggressively
regulated by the federal government.
9. The federal government does not have a right to oversee environmental matters. *
10. No additional tax dollars should go to the Environmental Protection Agency. *
11. Clean energy solutions are too costly for tax-payers. *
12. Private companies should legally abide by their own environmental standards. *
13. The federal government should have a minimal role in regulating the coal
industry. *
14. Coal companies are not obligated to reduce pollution. *
15. Private companies should not be aggressively regulated for the sake of preventing
water pollution. *
16. Private companies should not be punished for causing water pollution. *

From Eadeh and Chang (2019, Study 2)
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APPENDIX H
DEMOGRAPHICS

What is your age? _______
What is your ethnicity?
1. American Indian or Alaskan Native
2. Asian
3. Black or African-American
4. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific islander
5. White
6. Some other ethnicity (please specify)
What is your gender?
1. Female
2. Male
3. Some other gender (please specify)
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?
1. Less than high school degree
2. High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
3. Some college but no degree
4. Associate degree
5. Bachelor degree
6. Graduate or professional degree
How honest were your responses on this survey?
(From 1 = not at all to 5 = very much so)
What year were you born? _______
Do you have any comments for the researcher?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX I
SCATTERPLOT MATRIX
Scatterplots for Variables by Condition
1

3

5

7

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

7

2 3 4 5 6 7
0

5

PO

1

3

1

7

2

4

6

EnvAtts

7

1

3

5

SysJust

7

1

3

5

CollAct

1 2 3 4 5

1

3

5

PInjust

1 2 3 4 5

NegAff

1 2 3 4 5

Fear

Empathy

1

3

5

7

1

3

5

7

1

3

5

7

1

2

3

4

5

Note. Variables were measured on 5- or 7-point Likert-type scales. Red “X” symbols
represent the data points for the threat condition, and blue triangles represent the data
points for the control conditions. Red lines are lines of best fit for the threat conditions,
and blue lines are lines of best fit for the comparison conditions. The center diagonal line
illustrates the univariate distribution for each variable across both conditions. Truncated
labels from top-left to bottom-right: PO = Political Orientation. EnvAtts = Environmental
Regulation Attitudes. SysJust = System Justification, CollAct = Collective Action
Intentions, PInjust = Perceived Injustice, and NegAff = Negative Affect. For the full
color version, please visit https://osf.io/2md4e/.

APPENDIX J
CORRELATION MATRICES
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals for Variables in the Environmental Threat Conditions (n = 218)
Variable
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1. Political Orientation

4.32

1.81

2. Negative Affect

3.03

1.07

.26**
[.13, .38]

3. Fear

2.23

1.20

.08
[-.06, .21]

4. Empathy

3.75

1.12

.78**
[.72, .83]
.55**

.41**

[-.03, .23]

[.45, .64]

[.30, .52]

.10

5. System Justification

3.83

1.25

-.51**
[-.60, -.41]

-.23**
[-.35, -.10]

-.14*
[-.27, .00]

-.04
[-.17, .09]

6. Perceived Injustice

5.50

1.24

.44**
[.33, .54]

.29**
[.17, .41]

.24**
[.11, .36]

.13*
[.00, .26]

-.60**
[-.68, -.51]

7. Environmental
Policy Preferences

5.53

1.08

.55**
[.45, .64]

.33**
[.21, .45]

.13
[.00, .26]

.24**
[.11, .36]

-.50**
[-.60, -.40]

.58**
[.49, .67]

8. Collective Action
Intentions

4.68

1.45

.49**
[.38, .58]

.52**
[.41, .61]

.29**
[.16, .40]

.31**
[.19, .43]

-.41**
[-.51, -.29]

.45**
[.33, .55]

.58**
[.49, .67]

.33

.47

.15*
[.02, .28]

.26**
[.13, .38]

.17*
[.04, .30]

.19**
[.06, .31]

-.08
[.05, -.21]

.13
[.00, .26]

.31**
[.19, .23]

9. Collective Donation
Behavior

.22**
[.09, .34]
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Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each Pearson
correlation (or point-biserial correlation for collective donation behavior). Political orientation ranges from 1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. Bold indicates p < .05.

Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals for Variables in the Comparison Conditions (n = 211)
Variable
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1. Political Orientation

4.70

1.77

2. Negative Affect

1.28

0.57

.04
[-.10, .18]

3. Fear

1.25

0.61

.12
[-.02, .25]

.85**
[.81, .88]

4. Empathy

2.59

1.26

-.09
[-.22, .05]

.12
[-.01, .25]

.12
[-.02, .25]

5. System Justification

3.93

1.37

-.48**
[-.58, -.37]

-.03
[-.17, .10]

-.05
[-.18, .09]

.03
[-.10, .17]

6. Perceived Injustice

5.33

1.43

.40**
[.28, .50]

.11
[-.02, .24]

.06
[-.07, .20]

.03
[-.10, .17]

-.64**
[-.72, -.56]

7. Environmental
Policy Preferences

6.00

1.11

.58**
[.49, .67]

-.12
[-.25, .02]

-.07
[-.21, .06]

.03
[-.10, .17]

-.45**
[-.55, -.33]

.52**
[.41, .61]

8. Collective Action
Intentions

4.69

1.49

.51**
[.40, .60]

.08
[-.06, .21]

.12
[-.02, .25]

.17*
[.04, .30]

-.33**
[-.45, -.21]

.37**
[.25, .48]

.64**
[.56, .72]

.33

.47

.14*
[.00, .27]

.13
[-.02, .26]

.11
[.00, .24]

.10
[-.03, .23]

-.09
[-.23, .04]

.11
[-.03, .24]

.20**
[.07, .33]

9. Collective Donation
Behavior

8

.28**
[.15, .40]

Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each Pearson
correlation (or point-biserial correlation for collective donation behavior). Political orientation ranges from 1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. Bold indicates p < .05.
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